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1 Introduction 
  
1.1 Rationale 
In March 2017, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter the ‘ECJ’ or the ‘EU Court’) gave two long-awaited decisions in the field of 
non-discrimination. In cases Achbita1 and Bougnaoui2, the EU Court ruled for the first 
time on the limits of religious manifestation at work, as well as the legal capacity of a 
private-sector employer to impose those limits. In the cases, two female employees of 
two private sector enterprises had been dismissed due to wearing an Islamic scarf (a hijab) 
at work. The cases were brought separately to the ECJ for preliminary ruling by the 
Belgian (in Achbita) and the French (in Bougnaoui) Courts of Cassation, but it decided to 
give its decisions in parallel, on the same day. The questions directed to the Court were 
different in each case, but in essence, the Court had to take a stance on whether the 
prohibition of religious scarves in a private-sector enterprise constituted a breach of EU 
law, or not. In principle, the EU Court answered in the negative. 
In general, limiting religious manifestation is a highly politicized issue in contemporary 
Europe. Opinions vary within societies but also between them. France and Belgium 
(where the two cases originate from) constitute the other end of the continuum, being 
secular states by definition, by posing legal restrictions on the wearing of religious outfit 
in public as well as in public employment. With all likelihood, non-discrimination and 
freedom of religion are also issues of growing importance, taking into account the 
increasing religious pluralism in Europe. Questions of religious tolerance continue to be 
debated across European societies. 
From legal perspective, cases Achbita and Bougnaoui open up controversies. First, non-
discrimination is one of the eldest competency areas of the European Union, as well as 
an area where the EU Court has traditionally been very active. With its non-discrimination 
case law, the ECJ has expanded the scope of EU law and thus acted as the primus motor 
                                                          
1 Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita and Centrum viir gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijdning v. 
G4S Secure Solutions NV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203. 
2 Case C-188/15, Asma Bougnaoui and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v. Micropole 
SA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:204. 
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of European integration. In Achbita and Bougnaoui, however, the EU Court chose another 
path: instead of activism, it chose restraint. It failed to follow its own case law on non-
discrimination, by setting the standard for religious discrimination lower than the standard 
for discrimination based on other grounds recognized by EU law. The decisions have 
been much criticized for this by legal academia.3 
Second – and also contrary to its common habits – in its argumentation the EU Court 
drew heavily on the European Court of Human Rights’ case law (hereinafter the ‘ECtHR’ 
or the ‘Strasbourg Court’). Traditionally, the EU Court’s human rights decisions have 
been much criticized due to failures to recognize the international environment in which 
also EU law operates.4 In particular, coherence between the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter the ‘ECHR’) and EU law has attracted much scholarly interest, 
even more so since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon.5 The question has grown in 
importance because in theory contradictions between the two human rights regimes 
should no longer be possible, EU primary law now giving full recognition to the rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR.6 To buttress the point, TEU 6 (3), as amended by the Lisbon 
                                                          
3 Vickers, L. (2017). Achbita and Bougnaoui: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back for Religious Diversity 
in the Workplace. European Labour Law Journal, 8(3), pp. 232-257; Hennette-Vauchez, S. (2017). Equality 
and the Market: The unhappy fate of religious discrimination in Europe. European Constitutional Review, 
13 (4), pp. 744-758; Howard, E. (2017). Islamic headscarves and the CJEU: Achbita and 
Bougnaoui. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(3), pp. 348-366; Collins, P. (2018). 
Covering Up? Client Embarrassment, Neutral Intolerance and Wearing Headscarves at Work. Law 
Quarterly Review, 134, pp. 31-37; Hambler, A. (2018). Neutrality and Workplace Restrictions on 
Headscarves and Religious Dress: Lessons from Achbita and Bougnaoui. Industrial Law Journal, 47(1), pp. 
149-164; Brems, E. (2017), European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious Dress in the Workplace. 
IACL Blog (International Association of Constitutional Law), [https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/test-
3/2018/5/26/analysis-european-court-of-justice-allows-bans-on-religious-dress-in-the-workplace], 
accessed 13 June 2019. 
4 de Búrca, G. (2013). After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator, p. 174. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 20 (2), pp. 168-184; de Jesús 
Butler, I. (2008). Binding the EU to International Human Rights Law. Yearbook of European Law, 27 (1), pp. 
277-320. 
5 E.g. Douglas-Scott, S. (2011). The European Union and human rights after the Treaty of Lisbon, Human 
Rights Law Review, 11 (4), pp. 645-682; Alidadi, K., Foblets, M. & Vrielink, J. (2012). A test of faith? 
Religious diversity and accommodation in the European workplace. Farnham: Ashgate; Arestis, G. (2013). 
Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg perspective. European Legal 
Studies / Etudes Européennes Juridiques, Research Papers in Law, 2/2013; Arold Lorenz, N. (2013). The 
European human rights culture: A paradox of human rights protection in Europe? Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
6 Art. 52 (3) EUCFR: 3. “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope 
3 
 
Treaty, obliges the EU to accede to the ECHR. Despite this obligation, after ten years, the 
accession process is still on hold. The main culprit is the EU Court, which has rejected 
the accession agreement, twice, thereby clearly expressing its unwillingness to subject its 
decisions to the scrutiny of the Strasbourg Court.  
To sum up, in Achbita and Bougnaoui the EU Court abandoned its own case law in non-
discrimination and instead aligned itself with the Strasbourg Court. From the perspective 
of coherence between the two human rights regimes, the conclusion might seem ideal.7 
However, as regards coherence of EU law, the conclusion seems controversial. What 
makes religious discrimination less important than discrimination based on other grounds 
recognized by EU law? Why in these two cases did the ECJ lean towards the Strasbourg 
Court, if it is not a standard procedure? What kind of a human rights adjudicator the EU 
Court is in the post-Lisbon era, and what are the issues affecting its line of reasoning? 
The aim of the thesis is to search answers to these questions through the two cases. 
1.2 The increased importance of the EU Court as a human rights adjudicator 
Traditionally, the EU Court has not been identified (and studied) as a human rights 
adjudicator. This is due to the simple fact that originally, human rights did not play any 
role in the European project; the founding fathers did not see them relevant to an 
organization with mainly economic aspirations. 
To clarify, this is not to argue that the role of the EU Court in human rights protection 
would have been minor, just the opposite. It was precisely the (predecessor of the) EU 
Court, which soon found, that it was impossible to detach human rights from Community 
law, due to the fact that EC law could not provide lesser protection than national legal 
systems, all adhering not only to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) but 
                                                          
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” 
7 That said, as chapter 3.3 explains, direct referencing between the Strasbourg Court and the EU Court 
case law might not always be appropriate as the two regimes analyze cases from varying angles. The thesis 
argues that non-discrimination is one of the areas where the institutional differences between the two 
regimes should be taken into account. 
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also to several other international human right treaties. The solution invented by the EU 
Court was that it started to incorporate human rights into EU law through its adjudication.8 
Legally, the situation changed considerably with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which continued expanding the scope of EU law. More specifically, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the ‘EUCFR’) was elevated to 
the position of EU primary law. These elements together have increased the significance 
of the EU Court as a human rights adjudicator, also evidenced in the growing amount of 
cases raising human rights claims.9 
Interestingly, the proliferating ECJ human rights adjudication has not always been well 
received, either by the EU Member States, legal academia or the larger international 
community. To start with, the Member States have accused the Court of excessive 
activism in its human rights adjudication, claiming that the Court interprets EU law in a 
way not compatible with national constitutional traditions or interests.10 Non-
discrimination is one the areas in which those accusations have taken place.11 The EU 
Court has for instance been criticized for bypassing international human rights 
adjudication.12 Also a UN report refers to the failures of the ECJ to seek guidance from 
international human rights bodies, whether out of ignorance or sheer neglect.13 
                                                          
8 Douglas-Scott, S. (2011), pp. 647-649. This background, however, has not prevented the Union from 
presenting itself as a human rights forerunner. The Amsterdam Treaty (entering into force in 1999) added 
to the Treaties a blunt statement on the Union being “founded” on the principles of liberty, democracy 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms – still expressed in Article 6 (1) TEU. Smismans 
has argued that human rights were included in the European project on one hand to safeguard the Union’s 
growing competence in justice and home affairs, on the other hand to increase the legitimacy of the Union 
in the eyes of its citizens. Smismans, S. (2017). Fundamental rights as a political myth of the EU: can the 
myth survive? In Douglas-Scott, S. and Hatzis, N., eds. (2017). Research Handbook on EU Law and Human 
Rights. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
9 de Búrca, G. (2013), pp. 169-170. 
10 Recent ECJ cases Mangold (2005), Schecke (2010), Kücükdeveci (2010) and Test-Achats (2011) are 
examples of this. See further analysis for example in Muir, E. (2014). Fundamental Rights, an unsettling 
EU competence. Human Rights Review, 15 (1), pp. 25-37. 
11 de Búrca, G. (2011). The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law, pp. 492-493. In de Búrca, G., & Craig, P. 
(2011). The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edition). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 465-497. 
12 de Búrca, G. (2013), pp. 173-174. 
13 OHCHR report (2011). The European Union and the International Human Rights Law, p. 11. 
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The transition, then, from a court with purely economic modus operandi, to a court with 
a wide human rights mandate seems not to have been easy. Why is this so? For sure, the 
wider controversies related to human rights claims have to be acknowledged. As for 
example Young argues, even though there might be agreement as to such universal and 
indivisible goods as for instance human dignity or equality, there is much disagreement 
as to the content of these principles, not to mention the best means to achieve them.14 The 
constitutional pluralism of the Union also poses its challenges.15 That said, the thesis 
argues that a further explanation for the difficulties is to be found in the institutional 
positioning of the EU Court (see chapter 1.3. below). 
Taking into account both the Court’s multifaceted role and the increased focus of EU law 
on fundamental rights, the scholarly interest in analyzing the EU Court as a human rights 
adjudicator has been surprisingly low. Articles by de Búrca and Young referred to above, 
the latter building on the work of Weiler16 are welcome exceptions, but no full-fledged 
theory exists. Theoretically, the thesis is a contribution to this discussion. 
1.3 Institutional objectives of the EU Court: integration and stability 
The key argument of the thesis is that the ECJ’s line of reasoning in human rights cases 
reflects its institutional positioning. Surely, jurisprudential argumentation always has its 
contextual roots. However, the EU context is somewhat exceptional in a sense that in its 
adjudication, the EU Court needs to take into account the underlying political objective 
of the Treaties i.e. integration.17 In general, the EU Court’s role as the primus motor of 
                                                          
14 Young, A. L. (2017). EU fundamental rights and judicial reasoning: towards a theory of human rights 
adjudication for the European Union, p. 141. In Douglas-Scott, S. & Hatzis, N., eds. (2017). Research 
handbook on EU law and human rights. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 139-161. 
15 Young (2017), pp. 143-144. 
16 Weiler, J.H.H. (2009). Fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries: Common standards and 
conflicting values in the protection of human rights in European Union space. In Kastoryano, R., ed. (2009). 
An Identity for Europe. The Relevance of Multiculturalism in EU Construction. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
17 Moorhead, T. (2014). The legal order of the European Union: The institutional role of the European Court 
of Justice. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, New York: Routledge, pp. 6-11. See also e.g. Bengoetxea, J. 
(1993). The legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European jurisprudence. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
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European integration is widely acknowledged in academic research.18 To be able to serve 
the purposes of integration, the Court has adopted the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy, which it has an institutional interest in safeguarding.19  
The other, perhaps less recognized institutional task of the ECJ is promoting the stability 
of the European project in the longer term. To do this, it has to respect the sensitive 
national interests involved in each case, a task prescribed to it directly also by EU law.20 
In practice, then, in its adjudication the Court has to balance between the need to 
safeguard the supremacy of EU law (also in relation to international law, in this case 
specifically to the European Convention), the constitutional interests of the Member 
States and the raison d’être of the European Union i.e. integration. The objective of the 
thesis is to analyze the way the Court strikes a balance between these various objectives 
in the two cases. 
Before moving any further, it needs to be acknowledged that this argument is somewhat 
contradictory to the mainstream understanding of the ECJ. The abundant literature of the 
Court draws a picture of an extremely assertive actor. For instance, Kelemen explicitly 
argues that the ECJ does not care about forging an institutional balance, simply because 
it does not have to.21 The ECJ’s human rights adjudication has often been provided as a 
prime example of this behavior.22 On the other hand, there are also researchers who argue 
that the EU Court is unwilling to rule against the core interests of the Member States. In 
                                                          
18 Weiler, J.H.H. (1991). The Transformation of Europe. The Yale Law Journal 100: 2403-83; Burley, A.M. 
and Mattli, W. (1993). Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration. International 
Organization, 47 (1), pp. 41-76; Garrett, G., Kelemen, D.R. and Schulz, H. (1998). The ECJ, national 
governments, and legal integration in the European Union. International Organization, 52(1), pp. 149–76; 
Stone Sweet, A. (2004). The Judicial Construction of Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
19 As regards supremacy, one often cited case is the Kadi case (2013), in which the ECJ assessed whether 
the EU regulation giving effect to UNSC resolutions on freezing assets of people and groups associated 
with the Taleban movement was lawful, especially as regards the protection of human rights of the 
claimants, who stated that their property was seized without any lawful process. The ECJ finally reached 
a controversial conclusion, annulling the regulation and thus implicitly also reversing the UN set sanctions 
on Mr. Kadi and Al Barakaat Foundation – a decision strongly emphasizing the supremacy of EU law. Joined 
cases C-402 and 415/15 P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council & Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
20 Art. 4 (2) TEU, Art. 52 (4) EU Charter. 
21 Kelemen, R. D. (2012). Introduction – the European Court of Justice and legal integration: Perpetual 
momentum? Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (1), pp. 1-7. 
22 See chapter 2.3.1. 
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the human rights context, Muir has recently found that despite their growing role in this 
field, EU institutions are still reluctant to actually making use of the fundamental rights 
discourse against the Member States.23 The Court’s rulings in Achbita and Bougnaoui 
also hint towards a cautious approach. 
Substantively, the thesis contributes to understanding the Court’s thinking and line of 
reasoning in non-discrimination. To this end, relevant EU law and ECJ case law related 
to non-discrimination will be discussed, as well as the ECHR (and ECtHR) stand on 
religious discrimination. Besides the substance and the outcome of the key decisions, 
methodologies and key principles of the ECJ and ECtHR in non-discrimination will be 
shortly explained. After that, the two cases will be presented and analyzed both from legal 
and institutional perspectives, considering how the Court’s institutional positioning has 
affected its judicial reasoning and conclusions in the two cases. 
Finally, it needs to be clarified that the primary aim of the thesis will be neither praising 
nor criticizing the Court’s decisions in Achbita and Bougnaoui, but rather explaining them 
from an institutional point of view, which, for its part, is closely related to the history of 
European integration in general and the EU Court in particular. Therefore, the thesis 
begins with a short introduction to the history of European integration, with a special 
focus on the role of the EU Court in that process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Muir, E. (2014), pp. 25-37. 
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2 The Court of Justice in the EU structure 
The chapter begins with a short introduction to the history European integration, 
clarifying the specificities of the European Union as a legal system. For this purpose, key 
principles and methods of EU law will be explained. 
An important part of this chapter is outlining the role of the ECJ in the EU structure. This 
is something that especially political scientists have been interested in for decades. Much 
of this research has focused on the ECJ’s alleged role in promoting integration through 
adjudication – through interpreting the Union (previously Community) law in an 
expansive manner. The claim has been exceptionally strong in areas touching upon 
fundamental rights and non-discrimination. On the other hand, there are researchers who 
have argued that the ECJ is incapable of taking expansive decisions without the 
acceptance of the Member States. 
While giving credit to both of these views, the chapter argues for an institutional 
understanding of the ECJ’s role, emphasizing not only its task as the ultimate guardian of 
EU law, but also its willingness to respect the institutional balance of the Union. From 
this perspective, the chapter argues – in line with Moorhead – that in its decision-making, 
the Court aims at sustaining the supremacy of EU law (also in relation to the ECHR), in 
a manner consistent with the Member States’ constitutional requirements, while also 
advancing the project of European integration. This is by no means an easy task, and 
requires careful balancing. 
The chapter ends by clarifying the relationship between the ECHR and EU law, which 
has changed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The changes brought by 
Lisbon accentuate the need to investigate the EU Court also as a human rights adjudicator, 
especially in comparison with the Strasbourg Court. 
2.1 Introduction to the European Union as a legal system 
2.1.1 A short history of European integration 
9 
 
European integration has its roots in the two devastating world wars, waged between the 
years 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. The latter ended in the demise of the Nazi Germany, 
but also led to the emergence of the Cold War. Creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951 – the first predecessor of the European Union – relates to 
both of these developments. The founding states of the ECSC (France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) agreed to administer their coal and steel 
resources under an international agreement, to reap the economic benefits of a common 
market of these materials. Politically, however, the underlying idea was to control the 
coal and steel production of Germany, to prevent its rearmament.24 
In the beginning, the focus of European integration was on economy. A key step towards 
this objective was the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC), which created a single market for goods, services, labor 
and capital across the EEC Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg). The same states were also signatories to the Euratom 
Treaty (European Atomic Energy Community). The Treaty of Rome continued to provide 
the legal framework for the Community for almost 30 years.25 
Over time, the level of ambition rose. The increasing substantive areas of the Community 
competence reflect this development. The additions of the Single European Act (entering 
into force in 1986) covered i.a. cooperation in economic and monetary union, social 
policy, economic and social cohesion and environmental policy. The Maastricht Treaty 
(entering into force in 1993), for its part, added the Community competence in areas such 
as public health, consumer protection and development cooperation. The Amsterdam 
Treaty (entering into force in 1999) introduced a new provision that conferred legislative 
competence on the Community to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.26 This provision served as 
                                                          
24 Craig, P. (2014). Development of the EU, pp. 9-13. In Barnard, C. and Peers, S. (eds). European Union 
law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 9-35. 
25 Ibid, pp. 13-16. 
26 Ibid, pp. 20-23. 
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the legislative basis for the two non-discrimination directives enacted in 2000, examined 
in the context of cases Achbita and Bougnaoui.  
The Lisbon Treaty (entering into force in 2009) was a result of years of bargaining. It was 
preceded by a failed attempt to adopt a Constitutional Treaty for the Union in the 
beginning of the 21st century, as well as the approval of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in 2000.27 Substantively, the Lisbon Treaty draws heavily on both of these 
documents: it puts to the forefront the values on which the EU is based, elevates the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to the position of primary law, and obliges the Union to 
accede to the European Convention.28 Noteworthy is also the fact that along with the 
Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ received full powers to control the legislative acts also in Justice 
and Home Affairs (the former third pillar).29 From human rights perspective, these 
changes are crucial and form an important background to this thesis: fundamental rights 
have clearly been lifted to the forefront of EU law. 
2.1.2 Direct effect and supremacy of EU law 
The European Union as a legal system is a much explored topic, especially in European 
and American research circles. Much interest has been devoted to the question whether it 
is a sui generis legal system i.e. something between international and municipal legal 
systems, or whether it is – despite its peculiarities – just another form of international 
law.30 Whatever the answer, there a few key principles that are distinctive to EU law. 
They also form the core of the ECJ’s toolbox, which is why they warrant to be presented 
here: the principles of ‘supremacy’ and ‘direct effect’. 
                                                          
27 Ibid, pp. 25-27. 
28 Piris, J. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: A legal and political analysis. Cambridge [UK]; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 71. See also Art. 6 (1-2) TEU. 
29 Ibid, pp. 188-189. 
30 Esim. Weiler, J.H.H. (1991), pp. 2418-2422; Moorhead (2014), pp. 108-111; Waele, H. d. (2010). The 
Role of the Court of Justice in the European Integration Process. A Contemporary and Normative 
Assessment, p. 8. Hanse Law Review; The E-Journal on European, International and Comparative Law, 6, 
pp. 3-26. 
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In the EU context, the principle of direct effect originates from the case Van Gend en 
Loos31, in which a Dutch company complained about the Dutch Tax Authority’s 
(Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen) decision leading to an increased tariff on 
imports from West Germany. The company (Van Gend en Loos) objected to this measure 
and claimed that it constituted a violation of Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome (i.e. the 
EEC Treaty), which stated that Member States must refrain not only from introducing 
between any new customs duties within the Community, but also from increasing those 
they already apply.32 
In its ground-breaking decision the ECJ established that provisions of the Rome Treaty 
were capable of creating legal rights that could be enforced by both natural and legal 
persons. According to the Court, the Community constituted “a new legal order of 
international law”, the subjects of which comprised not only of Member States, but also 
of their nationals.33 In practice, this meant that Community law could confer rights also 
directly on individuals, which the courts of the Member States had to enforce. To many 
researchers, this decision stands at the heart of the European Union’s human rights 
mandate: the possibility for private individuals to claim rights against the Member States 
has formed the EU into the rights-based system that it is today.34  
Costa v. ENEL further cemented the Court’s thinking on the direct effect of Community 
law.35 However, Costa v. ENEL was important from another perspective, too. In the 
decision, the ECJ clarified the relationship between EU law and domestic law, enshrined 
in the principle of supremacy (or primacy as it is also called). In the decision, the Court 
stated that the EEC Treaty had created its own legal system which automatically had 
become an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts 
                                                          
31 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. 
32 Art. 30 TFEU. 
33 Van Gend en Loos (Grounds of judgment, Section II B – On the substance of the Case). 
34 De Vries S. A. (2017). The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU’s ‘creeping’ competences: does the 
Charter have a centrifugal effect for fundamental rights in the EU?, p. 62. In Douglas-Scott, S., Hatzis, N., 
eds. (2017). Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
35 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL. See also de Witte, B. (2011). Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of 
the Legal Order, p. 328.  In Craig, P. and de Búrca, G., eds. (2011). The Evolution of EU Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 323-362. 
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were therefore bound to apply. Consequently, it was unacceptable for the Member States 
to take legal measures inconsistent with that legal system.36 
ECJ has justified the establishment of the two principles by arguing that it automatically 
emanates from the nature and spirit of EU law that it has to assume a higher position from 
that of national law. Was it not the case, the Member States could determine their position 
vis-à-vis EU law by themselves. In this scenario, the effectiveness of EU law would be 
compromized.37 In the context of this thesis, it is to be noted that in its case law the ECJ 
has rejected an interpretation that the Member States could provide a higher standard of 
human rights protection that that provided by EU law. The justification is that such a 
situation would undermine the supremacy of EU law.38 
Taken into consideration these developments, it is no wonder that to many researchers 
the underlying thread in the EU Court adjudication is expansiveness. The Court has 
shown “extreme self-confidence in changing just some general principles in some treaties 
to ‘a new legal order’, which we now know as European Union law”.39 As summarized 
by Tamm, the EU Court has conceived of itself as part of the European project and has 
cemented its position in this project – in particular for the purposes of this project – by 
interpreting very broadly the provisions that brought it into being.40 
2.2 The institutional role of the ECJ 
                                                          
36 Costa v ENEL (The Grounds for judgment, on the submission that the court was obliged to apply the 
national law). 
37 Ellis, E. and Watson, P.  (2013). EU anti-discrimination law (2nd edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p. 47. The principle of effectiveness (effet utile) – explicitly outlined by the Court in Case C-213/89 
Factortame, para 20 – necessitates that national courts set aside any provision of a national legal system 
and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice, which might impair the effectiveness of EU law. See 
also Hofmann, H. CH. (2014). General principles of EU law and EU administrative law, p. 199. In Barnard, 
C. and Peers, S., eds. (2014). European Union Law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, pp. 
196-225. 
38 Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, paras 56-58. See also Douglas-Scott, S. (2011), pp. 
675-676. 
39 Tamm, D. (2013). The History of the Court of Justice of the European Union Since its Origin, p. 11. In 
Bot, Y., Levits, E. & Rosas, A. (2013). The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and 
perspectives on sixty years of Case law. Hague, the Netherlands: T. M. C. Asser Press, pp. 9-36. 
40 Ibid, p. 14. 
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2.2.1 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
The European Court of Justice41 was founded in 1952 as a court of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). The adoption of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and thus the 
creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) widened the mandate of the Court 
to cover also the new communities. An important addition in the Rome Treaty to the 
Court’s mandate was a possibility of a preliminary ruling, which in the course of the years 
has become perhaps the Court’s most important tool for the development of the European 
Union law.42 
The core task of the Court of Justice of the European Union is to ensure that in 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.43 In order to do that, it 
reviews the legality of the acts of the EU institutions, ensures that the Member States 
comply with obligations under the Treaties, and interprets EU law at the request of the 
national courts (through preliminary rulings, as regulated under Art. 267 TFEU). The ECJ 
also has jurisdiction in actions for annulment of a measure, such as a regulation, directive 
or decision.44  
The judicial architecture of the Court, which has its seat in Luxembourg, has changed 
considerably in the last two decades. In fact, nowadays the Court of Justice of the 
European Union consists of several courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court 
(established in 1988 as the Court of First Instance) and specialized courts.45 The thesis 
focuses on the activities of the supreme court in this hierarchy i.e. the Court of Justice 
(previously the European Court of Justice). 
In principle, there is no hierarchical relationship between the EU Court and national 
courts, which have the last say in matters falling under their jurisdiction. The EU Court 
                                                          
41 The official name of the Court has changed during the years, but for the sake of clarity, it will be called 
‘the ECJ’ or just ‘the EU Court’ throughout the paper. See also Article 19 TEU and further information 
below. 
42 Tamm, D. (2013), pp. 19-20. See also Arnull, A. (2006). The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd 
edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33. 
43 Art. 19 (1) TEU. 
44 Official site of the EU Court [https://curia.europa.eu], visited on February 2, 2018; Art. 19 TEU, Arts 251-
281 TFEU. 
45 Art. 19 TEU. 
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has the final say only in issues related to interpretation and application of EU law. 
However, in practice it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between matters falling 
under each of these jurisdictions, which makes the relationship between the EU Court and 
national courts more complicated than it might first appear. Quantitatively, national courts 
are the main interpreters of EU law. 
Not only have the judicial architecture and the procedure of the Court changed, so has the 
diversity of cases brought before it. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EU Court has increasingly referred to the provisions of the Charter for Fundamental 
Rights.46 This is due to the developments briefly explained above: the accentuated 
fundamental rights focus of the Lisbon Treaty (including the binding force of the Charter), 
the expanding scope of the EU’s competences and the extension of the Court’s 
jurisdiction by the Lisbon Treaty.47 All these developments have led to an increased 
importance of the ECJ as a human rights adjudicator. 
2.2.2 The EU Court as the primus motor of European integration 
As briefly mentioned above, there has been much scientific interest in exploring the ECJ’s 
role in European integration. Many researchers have concluded that the Court’s 
adjudication has been an important factor contributing to legal integration within the 
European Union.48 On the other hand, there are researchers who emphasize the power of 
the Member States to influence the decision-making of the EU Court. Especially in 
constitutionally delicate issues, some say, the Court does not dare to step on the toes of 
the Member States. 
Theoretically, neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists have promoted 
fundamentally different views on the role of the ECJ in the integration process: the former 
have argued that the EU Court can almost independently pursue the integration agenda, 
                                                          
46 de Búrca, G. (2013), p. 169 
47 de Búrca, G. (2013), p. 170. 
48 Weiler, J.H.H. (1991). The Transformation of Europe. The Yale Law Journal 100: 2403-83; Burley, A.M. 
and Mattli, W. (1993). Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration. International 
Organization, 47 (1), pp. 41-76; Garrett, G., Kelemen, D.R. and Schulz, H. (1998). The ECJ, national 
governments, and legal integration in the European Union. International Organization, 52(1), pp. 149–76; 
Stone Sweet, A. (2004). The Judicial Construction of Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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while for the latter it has no independent influence on integration. Burley and Mattli 
provided the first neo-functional arguments about the ECJ. They called it a “hero” that 
“signals and paves the way [...] on which the political actors can further integration”.49 
Their research was in many ways continuation to the seminal work of Weiler, recognizing 
the key role of the EU Court in the constitutionalization of Community law.50 Later on, 
the ECJ’s role as the driving force of integration has received extensive research focus.51 
In contrast, the intergovernmentalist strand argues that the EU Court wants to avoid 
ending up in a situation where its decisions are contested by the Member States. This has 
led some researchers to argue that the Court is in fact nothing but a puppet of influential 
Member States – a judicial agent implementing the decisions of the political principals 
behind the scenes. In the beginning of the 1990’s, Garrett went as far as to argue that the 
Court has no autonomous influence whatsoever on integration since its decisions are 
consistent with the preferences of France and Germany.52 More recently, Carrubba and 
Gabel as well as Larsson and Naurin have claimed that the preferences of the Member 
State governments have a systematic and substantively important impact on ECJ 
decisions.53 In the context of human rights adjudication, de Búrca has argued that the 
ECJ’s focus is so heavily on ensuring the acceptance of its judgments to the national 
courts of the Member States, that it seems for the most part unconcerned about the impact 
and influence of its rulings.54 
Based on these examples, it is clear that the outright acceptance of the Member States’ 
interests by the ECJ is far from self-evident. On the other hand, a politically blind 
                                                          
49 Burley, A.M. and Mattli, W. (1993), p. 41, p. 48. 
50 Weiler J.H.H. (1991). The Transformation of Europe. The Yale Law Journal, 100: 2403-83. 
51 See for instance, Garrett G. (1995). The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union. International 
Organization, 49 (1), pp. 171-81; Stone Sweet, A. (2004); Alter, K.J. and Meunier-Aitsahalia, S. (1994). 
Judicial politics in the European Community: European integration and the pathbreaking “Cassis de Dijon” 
decision, Comparative Political Studies, 26 (4); Garrett, G., Kelemen, D.R. and Schultz, H. (1998). 
52 Garrett, G. (1992). International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: the European Community’s 
Internal Market, p. 558. International Organization, 46 (2), pp 533-560. 
53 Carrubba, C. J. and Gabel, M. (2008). Judicial Behaviour under Political Constraints: Evidence from the 
European Court of Justice. American Political Science Review, 102 (4), pp. 435-452; Larsson, O. and Naurin, 
D. (2016). Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the Risk of Override Affects the Court of 
Justice of the EU. International Organization, 70 (2), pp. 377-408. 
54 de Búrca, G. (2013), p. 184. 
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expansiveness does not seem probable either. A more plausible argument would thus 
seem that both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism include important elements 
of truth, but neither of them is sufficient on its own to explain the multifaceted reality. 
For sure, bold decisions of the ECJ need support by the Member States to have long-term 
impact. However, in practice the Court also has the power to shape integration even 
against the wishes of the Member States. Against this background, the thesis argues that 
a more comprehensive approach might be useful in understanding the EU Court’s line of 
reasoning. 
2.2.3 Towards an institutional approach 
In order to build a more comprehensive view on the ECJ’s thinking, the thesis relies on 
institutional understanding of judicial decision-making and its role in European 
integration. The approach was first presented by Mann in the 1970’s.55 Mann emphasized 
the institutional context the Court operated in, which required a certain kind of positioning 
from the ECJ. Reaching the right balance between the legislative, executive and judicial 
function – in other words the “responsible exercise of constitutional power” – was 
important.56 Sometimes this required judicial restraint, sometimes activism. 
More recently, Moorhead – relying besides Mann also on MacCormick57 and 
Weinberger58 – has investigated the institutional role of the EU Court. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the key argument of Moorhead is that the integration objective forms one 
of the foundational values of the European Union.59 It is thus one of the values guiding 
the functioning of the Union in general, and its Court in particular. Moorhead admits that 
it is an objective that is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, yet the Union is 
committed – in a foundational sense – to European integration. A factor attesting to this 
                                                          
55 Mann, C. J. (1972). The function of judicial decision in European economic integration. The Hague. 
56 Ibid, p. 151. 
57 MacCormick, N. (2007). Institutions of law: An essay in legal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
58 Weinberger, O. (1991). Institutionalist Theories of Law. In Amselek, P. & MacCormick, N. (eds). 
Controversies about Law’s Ontology. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. 
59 Moorhead, T. (2014), p. 8. 
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argument is the wording of Article 3 TEU, referring to the legally mandatory character of 
the Union (political) objectives mentioned therein.60 Moorhead continues: 
“[F]rom the perspective of the Court of Justice, the political objectives found in the Treaties are 
precisely those matters to which the ‘hard’ or precise legal provisions of the Treaties are directed 
to achieve. All legal regulation arising under the Treaties is directed in some way to the 
achievement of the social, economic and political ideals of European integration.”61 
 
From this perspective, Moorhead presents the key components of the European Union 
legal order: the Court aims at institutionally balanced decisions; sustaining and (where 
possible) developing the principle of supremacy of EU law, in a manner consistent with 
the Member States’ constitutional requirements, while also advancing the project of 
European integration.62 
This is an important point and theoretically the key idea informing this thesis. The 
institutional task of the Court is not only ensuring that the Treaty objectives are achieved 
but also safeguarding the stability of the Union project.63 This is to suggest that the Court 
aims at promoting integration, but not at any cost. Indeed, Moorhead argues that the EU 
Court fully acknowledges that it must be able to articulate legal demands in a manner 
viewed legitimate by its ‘institutional partners’ in the European project, including the EU 
Member States, because in practice the ability of the ECJ to promote the Treaty objectives 
depends on the will of domestic actors to cooperate.64 
This is why, in fact, the EU Court has not been as ‘activist’ as it could have been, taking 
into account the extremely wide mandate given to it by the Treaties. According to 
                                                          
60 Article 3 (3) TEU: ”The Union shall establish an internal market. [---] It shall promote economic, social 
and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. [---]” (emphasis added) 
61 Moorhead, T. (2014), p. 119. 
62 Ibid, p. 8. 
63 Ibid, p. 64. 
64 Ibid, pp. 11, 121. This also brings us back to the seminal article of Weiler, briefly referred to above. The 
article has often been labelled as a predecessor of neo-functionalism, emphasizing the role of the ECJ in 
furthering European integration. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the political dynamics Weiler 
suggests to lay behind this action is more important than the action per se. In his article, Weiler fully 
recognizes the political context in which the Court operates, and even highlights their interdependence. 
In fact, the main theoretical argument of the article (i.e. the exit and voice dichotomy) is conditioned by 
that context. Weiler J.H.H. (1991). The Transformation of Europe. The Yale Law Journal, 100: 2403-83, pp. 
2408-2409, 2431. 
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Moorhead, even the doctrine of supremacy has been utilized by the ECJ in a restricted 
manner – in a way the Court seems institutionally possible.65 For sure, many ECJ 
decisions have aroused criticism in the Member States. However, from an institutional 
perspective, dissatisfaction with the content of a single ruling needs to be conceptually 
separated from putting into question the viability of the EU Court altogether. The Court 
has proven to be a highly esteemed legal actor, which is reflected in the overall respect 
for its legal demands within the Union.66 From another angle it could be argued that the 
Member States have not questioned the raison d’être of the Union and its high court, even 
though they have not always been satisfied with the ways the Court implements its 
mandate.  
From an institutional point of view, thus, it is important to recognize that the EU Court is 
an autonomous but not an isolated organization: it operates neither in a legal nor a political 
vacuum. In a way, this makes the Court vulnerable to the Member States’ political 
aspirations. However, it is one thing to argue that the EU institutions engage in an active 
discussion with each other on various topics, and another to argue that the Court passively 
adopts the views of the Member States (possible even under direct pressure). Perhaps it 
could be argued, as Hatzopoulos does, that this type of inter-institutional dialogue is in 
fact useful, by functioning as a guarantee of the constant development of EU law.67 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the EU Court operates in a fundamentally different 
context than human rights tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights, or 
even domestic constitutional courts. In its adjudication, the EU Court needs to take into 
account a multiplicity of factors, including the objective of European integration as well 
as the need to avoid systemic clashes between Luxembourg and the national legal 
frameworks. In practice this leads, as Moorhead argues, to the EU Court’s interpretive 
                                                          
65 Moorhead, T. (2014), pp. 121-122. 
66 Moorhead, T. (2014), pp. 61-62. 
67 Hatzopoulos, V. (2013). Actively talking to Each Other: The Court and the Political Institutions. In 
Dawson, M. & de Witte, B. & Muir, E., eds. (2013). Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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logic being very dynamic, “[---] the ‘degree’ of integration in any given judgment varying 
as a result of complex array of political, legal and institutional considerations.”68 
2.3 Human rights in EU law and jurisprudence 
2.3.1 Human rights jurisprudence as an instrument of integration 
Before moving forward, in order to better understand the need to study the EU Court as a 
human rights adjudicator, especially in the post-Lisbon era, it is necessary to cast some 
light on the history of human rights in EU law and the EU Court’s jurisprudence. As 
briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, in the beginning, human rights 
considerations did not play any role in the European project. The EEC Treaty included 
no sections on fundamental rights because the founders did not see them relevant to a 
treaty with mainly economic aspirations. They also wanted to avoid parallel structures, 
taking into account the fact that all EEC members already were signatories to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).69 
During the first decades of existence of the European Communities, the protection of 
human rights mainly developed through the ECJ case law, often with some pushing by 
the Member States.70 The first often mentioned case is Stauder (1969), in which the ECJ 
classified fundamental rights as “general principles of Community law”.71 The 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) further affirmed this position, in which the 
Court famously claimed that the respect for fundamental rights formed an “integral part 
of the general principles of law” protected by the Court.72 Arnull explains this 
development by arguing that the general principles doctrine offered the EU Court a 
convenient way of reconciling the need to protect fundamental rights, as dictated by the 
Member States’ constitutions, with the doctrine of supremacy. Significant gaps between 
domestic legal orders and Community provisions could have led to disregard for 
                                                          
68 Moorhead, T. (2014), p. 128. 
69 Douglas-Scott, S. (2011), pp. 647-648. 
70 Douglas-Scott, S. (2011), p. 649. 
71 Case 26/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm, Grounds of judgment, paragraph 7. 
72 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft; Grounds of judgment, paragraph 4. 
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Community law.73 A system of protection of fundamental rights was thus gradually built 
up by the Court based on the constitutional principles of the Member States but also on 
international conventions74, of which the European Convention has been referred to by 
the EU Court as the most significant.75 
By the Millennium, several Member States had started to advocate for both full 
incorporation of fundamental rights into the TEU and the EU accession to the ECHR. At 
the Cologne European Council in 1999, the establishment of the EU Charter for 
Fundamental Rights was agreed upon, and finally adopted a year after in Nice.76 
2.3.2 Relationship between EU law and the ECHR 
The development culminated into the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which elevated 
the Charter for Fundamental Rights to the position of primary law, but also legally obliged 
the Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. This created growing 
expectations as to the increasing coherence between the two human rights regimes. Even 
before Lisbon, the accession of the European Union to the ECHR had been a topic for 
debate for many years. In its opinion 1/94 from 1994, the ECJ had found that the European 
Community at that time lacked the competence to accede to the Convention.77 The 
situation, however, had changed with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It could 
                                                          
73 Arnull, A. (2006). The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd edition). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 181-182. 
74 Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities, para 
13. 
75 Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Höchst v. Commission, para 13: “The Court has consistently held that 
fundamental rights are an integral part of the general principles of law the observance of which the Court 
ensures, in accordance with constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and the 
international treaties on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 
1950… is of particular significance in that regard.” 
76 Chalmers, D. and Tomkins, A. (2007). European Union public law: Texts and materials. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 246-249. 
77 Opinion 2/94 of the EU Court: Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, paras 34-35, EU:C:1996:140. 
21 
 
no longer be argued that the Union lacked the competence to proceed: on the contrary, it 
was now legally obliged to do that.78 
Despite this, with its opinion 2/13, the ECJ once again rebutted the accession agreement, 
criticizing it for not being compatible with the autonomy requirement of EU law. More 
specifically, the EU Court saw three main problems with the draft agreement: First, it did 
not reconcile the differing methodologies of the ECHR and EU law on the protection of 
human rights79; second, it undermined the principle of mutual trust between the EU 
Member States80; and third, the mechanism established by Protocol 16 to the ECHR could 
hamper the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure.81 It was apparent that the 
EU Court saw the accession shaking the modus operandi of EU law, undermining its 
autonomy and effectiveness. To the followers of the EU Court, there was nothing new in 
the argumentation. The Strasbourg Court, for its part, was openly disappointed in the 
ECJ’s unfavorable stance.82 
However, even though the accession process is still on hold, the importance of the 
Convention for EU law has already changed. This is due to Article 52 (3) of the EU 
Charter, now part of EU primary law, which provides that the meaning and the scope of 
those rights in the Charter, which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention are 
the same as those in the Convention.83 Weiß adds that according to the explanations of 
Article 52 (3), the meaning and the scope of the Convention rights are to be determined 
                                                          
78 TEU 6 (2): “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the 
Treaties.” 
79 79 Opinion 2/13 of the EU Court: Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms, paras 188-190. The underlying problem for the 
EU Court seems to be that the Contracting Parties to the ECHR are allowed to provide a higher standard 
of protection of fundamental rights than the ECHR provides, if they so wish. This is not the case under EU 
law (see Melloni, para 60). 
80 Opinion 2/13 of the EU Court: Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms, paras 191-195. 
81 Opinion 2/13, para 197. 
82 Council of Europe: Annual Report 2014 of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 6. 
83 Article 52 (3) EU Charter: “In so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” 
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not only by their wording, but also by the Strasbourg Court case law.84 From the 
perspective of EU law, this is a significant issue. With the provision, the EU legislature 
clearly strives for harmonization between the two human rights regimes, which is quite 
remarkable taking into account the apparent tension between full coherence of the two 
regimes and the autonomy of EU law, a prerequisite for European integration. One could 
assume that for the EU Court the latter weighs more. 
To prove the point, the provision has indeed turned out to be difficult to implement. 
According to legal researchers, even in its post-Lisbon decisions the EU Court has been 
reluctant to draw on the ECHR or the Strasbourg Court case law.85 At most, the EU 
Court’s case law is divided on the issue: with some decisions, it leans towards the ECHR 
regime, but with others, it seems to ignore that altogether.86 
Finally, the last phrase of Article 52 (3) EUCFR deserves specific attention (”The 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”). It is unclear 
whether the EU Court has ever used this provision in its decision to justify a higher level 
of protection than that provided by the ECHR, but at least during this research process no 
such cases were found. In the case PPU, the issue is mentioned but without a substantive 
impact on the conclusion.87 However, the provision is significant in the context of this 
thesis. It is referred to in her opinion by Advocate General Sharpston, advising the EU 
Court on case Bougnaoui. 88 Apart from the opinion of AG Sharpston, the issue remains 
undiscussed in the two cases.89 
 
 
                                                          
84 Weiß, W. (2011). Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human 
Rights after Lisbon, p. 81. European Constitutional Law Review, 7 (1), pp. 64-95. 
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3 Non-discrimination in European law and legal practice 
 
Non-discrimination is one of the most frequently protected principles of international 
human rights law. It is often guaranteed in the form of a general non-discrimination clause 
in the enjoyment of human rights, but sometimes also as an independent principle.90 In 
the European context it is covered by both the European Convention on Human Rights 
and EU law, as well as domestic legal systems. 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg perspectives to the issue are slightly different, however. The 
objective of this chapter is to compare the two legal regimes in this matter, in order to 
gain understanding of non-discrimination as a human rights issue (the Strasbourg 
framework) in comparison to non-discrimination as a matter of EU law. The comparison 
will open up further avenues to assessing the EU Court as a human rights adjudicator. 
The chapter starts by first exploring the EU non-discrimination framework followed by a 
brief introduction to the ECHR framework. It also shortly discusses the ECtHR Article 9 
case law, specifically as regards religious manifestation. This is important as the EU Court 
was faced with the question for the first time in Achbita and Bougnaoui, whereas the 
Strasbourg Court already had reached several conclusions in similar matters. Finally, the 
two non-discrimination regimes will be compared with each other, in order to be able to 
better contextualize the EU Court’s approach in Achbita and Bougnaoui. 
3.1 Non-discrimination in EU law and legal practice 
3.1.1 EU primary and secondary law 
In the beginning, the EU (then EEC) legislators were mainly interested in equal treatment 
of different nationalities. The EEC Treaty (Art. 6) provided a general prohibition of any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. In practice, however, the principle only applied 
                                                          
90 Besson, S. (2012). Evolutions in Non-discrimination law within the ECHR and the ESC systems: it takes 
two to tango in the Council of Europe, p. 154. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 60 (1), pp. 147-
180. 
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to EU citizens and in cross-border situations.91 Another area at the focus was gender 
equality. The rationale was to prevent some of the EU Member States from gaining a 
competitive advantage by offering lower salaries or otherwise less favorable working 
conditions for women.92 
When the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999, the EU gained the ability to take 
action to combat discrimination on various grounds. This competence led to the 
introduction of new equality directives: the Framework Directive93 prohibiting 
discrimination in employment on several bases, and the Racial Equality Directive94 
prohibiting discrimination based on race or ethnicity in employment, but also in accessing 
the social security system, goods and services. Especially the latter constituted a 
significant expansion of the scope of non-discrimination under EU law. It recognized that 
to allow individuals to reach their full potential, it was essential to guarantee them equal 
access to education, health and housing.95 
The main primary source of EU non-discrimination law are the Treaties, as amended 
during the decades. Article 2 TEU recognizes the elementary importance of equality as 
one of the founding values of the European Union.96 Article 3 (3) TEU obliges the EU to 
combat social exclusion and discrimination, to promote both social and economic 
progress.97 According to Ellis and Watson, the TFEU includes three different types of 
                                                          
91 Bell, M. (2011). The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening, p. 612-613. In Craig, P. and 
de Búrca, G., eds. (2013). The evolution of EU law (2nd edition). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 611-639. 
92  European Agency for Fundamental Rights: Handbook on European Non-Discrimination Law (2018), pp. 
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equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
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provisions important in this field: statements of principle or intent, provisions that convey 
substantive rights and provisions that authorize the institutions of the Union to make 
secondary legislation.98 For instance, Article 8 TFEU states that in all its activities, the 
Union aims to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality. Article 10 TFEU – a new 
provision added by the Lisbon Treaty – further stress, that in defining and implementing 
its policies and activities, the Union aims at combatting discrimination. Bell argues that 
with these two articles the EU has established a policy of mainstreaming non-
discrimination in all its policies and action.99 In other words, it has not only 
constitutionalized the principle of non-discrimination in its primary law but also made it 
an objective of the Union throughout all policy areas. 
Article 19 (1) TFEU needs to be specifically mentioned as it introduces the right for the 
Council, acting unanimously and in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, to take action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.100 Article 19 is not a freestanding right, however. It cannot be invoked to 
challenge the legality of EU institutions or the Member States, but it rather serves as a 
legal basis, which permits the EU to act.101 
To complement other primary law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights contains a list 
of human rights that the EU and its Member States are to respect in all their action. As 
mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty granted the Charter the same legal status as the 
Treaties. As a result, EU institutions are now legally obliged to comply with the Charter, 
as are the EU Member States when implementing EU law.102 Under the title ‘Equality’ 
(Articles 20-26), the EU Charter emphasizes the importance of the principle of equal 
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between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.” 
98 Ellis, E. and Watson, P. (2013), p. 13. 
99 Bell, M. (2011). The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening, p. 630. In Craig, P. and de 
Búrca, G., eds. (2013). The evolution of EU law (2nd edition). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 611-639. 
100 Ellis. E. and Watson, P. (2013), p. 15. 
101 Speekenbrink, S. (2012). European Non-Discrimination Law: A Comparison of EU Law and the ECHR in 
the Field of Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Religion in Public Employment with an Emphasis on the 
Islamic Headscarf Issue. Utrecht University Repository (dissertation), p. 37. 
102 Art. 51 (1) EU Charter 
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treatment in the EU legal order. Specifically, Article 21 (1) contains a prohibition of 
discrimination on various grounds.103 
One of the key characteristics of EU non-discrimination law is that it differentiates 
between direct and indirect discrimination. Definitions are provided by the relevant 
secondary legislation, where direct discrimination is defined as one person being treated 
“less favorably than other is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation”.104 
Indirect discrimination, for its part, takes place when “an apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion of belief, a particular 
disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons”.105 
Under EU law, a case of direct discrimination on grounds of religion or belief can only 
be justified under two different circumstances: First, if the nature of the particular 
occupational activities so insist106, or second, if it is necessary for public security, for the 
maintenance of public order, for the protection of health or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.107 Indirect discrimination, however, can be more easily justified. 
It can be accepted if it has a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary.108 
3.1.2 Case law of the ECJ in non-discrimination  
                                                          
103 Art. 21 (1) EU Charter: “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
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104 Directive 2000/78/EC, Art. 2 (a). 
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27 
 
As mentioned above, originally the principle of equal treatment (i.e. prohibition of non-
discrimination) seems to have been merely instrumental in the European project. As Bell 
notes, equal treatment (of employees) and the objectives of cross-border free movement 
and integration of markets go hand in hand.109 Another area that the EU (EEC) legislators 
were originally interested in was gender equality. However, the interest was extremely 
narrow, only covering the right to equal pay for equal work, due to its explicit protection 
by the EEC Treaty (Art. 119; now Art. 157 TFEU). This becomes clear in the ECJ 
decision in Defrenne (III), in which the EU Court famously recognized fundamental 
human rights as general principles of Community law, also adding that “there can be no 
doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental 
rights”110. Despite this, it concluded that besides remuneration the Community had no 
responsibility for supervising the observance of the principle of equality between men 
and women at work.111 
Defrenne, however, was only the beginning of a larger, including legislative change. 
During the years following Defrenne the EU legislation was broadened, leading to a more 
general principle of sex equality in employment.112 New legislation was consequently 
followed by further litigation: for instance, in Dekker (1990) the Court interpreted the 
original equal treatment Directive 76/207 to provide protection for pregnant women in 
access to employment.113 In Barber (1991) the Court ruled that Article 119 EEC required 
equality in respect of occupational pension age.114 In the Grant case (1998) the Court 
concluded that a refusal by an employer to permit a spouse of a homosexual employee 
the same benefits as other spouses were allowed to, did not constitute discrimination in 
the context of Article 119 EEC (or Directive 75/117).115 As with Defrenne, however, the 
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legislative gap was filled afterwards with new EU legislation prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation.116 
In the beginning, thus, the principle of non-discrimination constituted primarily an 
instrument of economic integration, but things have changed since. According to Bell, its 
contents now stretch “well beyond the minimum intervention required by a pure market 
integration rationale”.117 In fact, it is sometimes claimed to be one of the most expansive 
areas of EU human rights activity – an area where the ECJ has been most prudent to 
expand the legal competency of the European Union.118 From this perspective, there are 
two post-Lisbon phenomena that warrant to be presented here. 
First, as Douglas-Scott and Hatzis explain, after Lisbon the ECJ has for the first time 
declared an individual provision of a legal instrument invalid, as it was alleged to 
constitute an unlawful derogation from the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women.119 To Douglas-Scott and Hatzis this example demonstrates the increased 
capability of the ECJ, based on the EU Charter and the increased fundamental rights focus 
of the Union, to review EU measures.120 
Second, in Kücükdeveci (2010), the EU Court confirmed that prohibition of non-
discrimination on grounds of age was a general principle of EU law. In some respect, the 
decision was continuation to Mangold, where the ECJ for the first time had recognized 
the existence of a general principle of equality with respect to age.121 In Kücükdeveci, 
however, the Court made it perfectly clear that the general principle of EU law prohibiting 
discrimination in the field of employment was only “given expression” in Directive 
2000/78.122 In other words, the Court argued that non-discrimination, as a principle, was 
something beyond EU primary and secondary law, and it was this background the Court 
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reflected in its decision, not only the wording of the Directive. Furthermore, in 
Kücükdeveci, the ECJ did not confine it approach to the scope of employment law. On 
the contrary, it explicitly referred to the entire scope of EU law.123 The decision therefore 
arguably constitutes a significant expansion of the scope of EU law in this area. 
3.1.3 Non-discrimination as a general principle of EU law 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to give further attention to the general 
principles doctrine of the European Union, referred to above. Just like the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect, the general principles doctrine is an invention of the EU 
Court. According to Ellis and Watson, the EU Court created the general principles 
doctrine to serve as an interpretive tool, “to put flesh on the bones of the legal system”.124 
From this perspective, general principles have a gap-filling function: they serve as bridge-
builders between abstraction (posited law) and reality (the context in which the law is 
applied). As such, there is nothing extraordinary in them. On the contrary, one could argue 
that the existence of these type of interpretive tools is of crucial importance to functioning 
of any legal system. 
However, to define the general principles doctrine simply as an interpretive tool does not 
make justice to its legal significance. Instead of just guiding on how to interpret EU 
legislative acts, the principles are legally binding as such on all EU institutions in the 
exercise of their competences. In practice, they are used by the EU Court as criteria 
against which it assesses the legality of EU acts.125 To be perfectly clear, for the EU Court 
the (unwritten) general principles of EU law have a similar legal status as the (written) 
Treaty provisions.126 This view has been spelled out by the ECJ for example in the Grant 
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case.127 The Member States, too, are to respect the general principles when implementing 
the Union law.128  
The general principles primarily derive from the laws of the Member States and 
international legal instruments, to which the Member States are signatories. The European 
Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) constitutes one of the most important of those 
sources.129 Ellis and Watson argue that in establishing the general principles, the Court 
has assessed the degree of convergence among the different national systems. The more 
convergence there has been on a particular issue, the more likely the Court has been to 
find that a general principle of law exists.130 From this perspective, one could argue that 
in fact the general principles of EU law are not something the EU Court has autonomously 
invented, but instead reflections of the legal traditions of the EU Member States.131 
In the fundamental rights framework, the ECJ used the doctrine for the first time in 1969 
in Stauder, in which it made clear that fundamental rights were part of the general 
principles of Community law, which the Court would protect.132 In subsequent cases the 
Court clarified that it looked into constitutional traditions of the Member States133 as well 
as relevant international treaties to which the Member States were signatories134 in 
defining which fundamental rights formed part of the general principles of Community 
law. As mentioned above, the Court needed the general principles doctrine to fill the gaps 
in the Community legislation, but also to calm down the national courts (especially in 
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Italy and in Germany), concerned about the level of fundamental rights protection offered 
by Community law.135 
Finally, it is important to note that many of the rights and principles initially established 
under the ECJ case law have been later incorporated into positive law. This has not led, 
however, to abandoning of the general principles doctrine. On the contrary, under Article 
6 (3) TEU, rights are also protected as general principles of EU law.136 The approach 
adopted by the ECJ in Kücükdeveci proves that the Court is still using the general 
principles doctrine in its human rights adjudication. 
3.2 The Strasbourg framework 
3.2.1 Non-discrimination in the European Convention on Human Rights 
The Council of Europe (CoE) was created in 1949 as a reaction to the stalemate of the 
newly established United Nations. It soon became clear that legally binding universal 
human rights instruments would not be available any time soon137, which urged the 
European states to take action. They decided to create their own human rights instrument, 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as a court to look after its 
implementation (the European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter the ‘ECtHR’ or the 
‘Strasbourg Court’). The focus of the ECHR is on civil and political rights.138 Currently 
the ECHR is ratified by 47 states, including all EU Member States.139  
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The protection against discrimination can be derived from three different sources in the 
ECHR: the substantive provisions, from Article 14, and from Protocol 12 to the 
Convention. 
As far as the substantive provisions are concerned, Article 9 ECHR is of primary 
importance for this thesis, protecting the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
The language of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the right to 
freedom of religion is in line with the ICCPR.140 Art. 9 (1) ECHR recognizes that 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and that this right 
also includes the right to manifest those beliefs. Art. 9 (2) prescribes that freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations that are dictated 
by law and are “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”.141 
Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in 
the Convention142. In other words, it does not create an additional right, but only a 
principle that applies when the case at hand falls within the ambit of other rights of the 
Convention (“accessory character”).143 Although these rights need not to be violated for 
Article 14 to be invoked (autonomy of the principle), its violation will not be examined 
by the Strasbourg court when other rights in the Convention are regarded as being violated 
(subsidiarity of the principle).144 Some researchers have criticized that the reliance of 
Article 14 on other substantive rights by the ECHR has limited its effectiveness.145 
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Protocol 12 (2000) to the ECHR, ratified by 20 Council of Europe Member States (of 
which only a handful are EU Member States)146, expands the scope of the prohibition of 
discrimination to equal treatment in the enjoyment of any right, including rights under 
national law.147 In other words, it provides for a general prohibition of discrimination, in 
contrast with the more limited provision included in Art. 14 ECHR. The protocol entered 
into force in 2005. So far, this protocol has been rarely used as a basis for decision.148 
3.2.2 Non-discrimination in the ECtHR case law 
Neither Article 14 nor Protocol 12 spell out the meaning of discrimination. In its case law, 
the ECtHR has stated that distinction is discriminatory if it “has no objective and 
reasonable justification” or if there is “no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.”149 ECtHR nowadays 
interprets the concept to cover both direct and indirect discrimination, in line with EU law 
(cross-fertilization). In ECtHR, there has been a clear increase in non-discrimination cases 
in recent years, especially after 2000 when the Strasbourg Court started to acknowledge 
also indirect discrimination.150 The first case of application of Art 14 ECHR (to sex 
discrimination) only dates back to 1985151, and half of the cases claiming violation of that 
Article have been decided since 2007.152 In comparison to the ECJ, it is good to note that 
the majority of cases dealt with by the Strasbourg Court take place outside the realm of 
employment.153  
As far as the protected grounds are concerned, the ECHR is explicitly – deliberately – 
undetermined about the possible grounds for discrimination. The treaty text (Art. 14 
ECHR) reads in an open-ended manner: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
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forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” (emphasis added). In 
other words, the definition is open-ended, including no exclusive understanding of 
potential grounds for discrimination. The Strasbourg Court has underlined this open-
endedness by saying that the list is “illustrative and non-exhaustive”.154 
In some cases, however, the ECtHR has concurred that only discrimination based on 
immutable personal characteristics matters.155 Gerards offers a useful example of the 
Court’s thinking in this regard: In the case of Magee, it found that a difference in the 
procedural rights of persons arrested and detained in England and Wales as compared to 
those arrested and detained in Northern Ireland did not amount to discrimination within 
the meaning of Article 14. This was because the difference of treatment could not be 
explained by personal characteristics of the detainees but on geography.156 According to 
Gerards, these two lines of case law still exist in parallel.157 
Furthermore, not all grounds for discrimination are equal to the ECtHR. Instead, it makes 
a distinction between ‘suspect’ and other grounds. According to the ECtHR, the 
justification for the distinction is that historically, certain groups have faced prejudice and 
social exclusion. Such prejudice may have resulted in legislative distortions, negatively 
affecting the realization of the potential of these people.158 This is why the Court needs 
to be particularly alert regarding certain grounds. In a specific case, if it has a reason to 
believe that discrimination is based on one of the suspect grounds, the level of scrutiny 
becomes more intense. In those cases, the threshold for accepting justifications for the 
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discriminatory action also becomes higher.159 At least gender, nationality, race, sexual 
orientation and religion are among the suspect grounds.160 
Finally, in contrast with EU law, the non-discrimination regime of the ECHR provides an 
objective justification test both for direct and indirect discrimination.161 Whereas EU law 
does not allow direct discrimination (apart from a few exceptions), for the Strasbourg 
Court even direct discrimination can be justified if it pursues an acceptable aim and is not 
disproportionate to that aim.162 In this sense, ECtHR’s view on discrimination is more 
lenient. As to indirect discrimination, both regimes share more or less the same approach. 
3.2.3 Religious manifestation in Article 9 case law 
Article 9 ECHR protects the freedom of religion or belief. It covers both internal (the 
private sphere) and external dimensions (i.e. public manifestation). However, as 
mentioned above, the right is not absolute. It is subject to limitations in cases where those 
limitations are “necessary in a democratic society” and have a legitimate aim (public 
safety, protection of public order, health or morals, and protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others). Furthermore, the limitations have to be prescribed by law.163 
In practice, the methodology of the ECtHR starts with by assessing whether the state has 
interfered with a person’s right to freedom of religion. This applies also to cases dealing 
with religious manifestation. According to for instance van Dijk et al, in Article 9 case 
law the Court has usually been rather reluctant to acknowledge an interference.164 Instead, 
as White and Ovey state, the ECtHR has made a separation between manifestations that 
are “objectively necessary” and those that are necessary only according to the applicant 
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himself.165 It goes without saying that the line between these two categories is arguable. 
In addition, the Strasbourg Court has made a distinction between cases where the inability 
to manifest religion is clearly due to state behavior, and those cases where it is, according 
to the Court, mostly attributable to the free choice of the applicant.166 According to 
Sandberg, the ECtHR has been particularly strict concerning religious manifestation in 
the context of employment.167 In those contexts it has often emphasized the free choice 
of the individual, signifying that applicants have the freedom to leave their job and seek 
employment elsewhere if they so wish (thus there being no interference).168 
If, however, an interference with a person’s freedom of religion is found, the burden of 
proof switches from the applicant to the respondent state. This means that the state has to 
be able to show that the restrictive measure it has taken is prescribed by law, it has a 
legitimate aim and it is proportionate to reaching that aim. Here, again, the ECtHR has 
usually been favorable to the respondent state. First, it has adopted a wide conception of 
what may constitute a legitimate aim. Article 9 (2) provides three general categories of 
legitimate aims (public safety; protection of public order, health and morals; protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others), but also other aims have been accepted as legitimate, 
often without explanation.169  
Second, a national measure that limits religious manifestations should be “necessary in a 
democratic society”. According to the ECtHR case law, there should be a “pressing social 
need” for something to be considered necessary.170 Ultimately, the question culminates 
into to a proportionality test. In other words, an interference in one’s freedom of religion 
must be no greater than what is necessary to addressing that pressing social need.171 
According to Speekenbrink, the proportionality test of Article 9 (2) is relatively lenient. 
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This is due to the wide margin of appreciation left to the Contracting States as to the 
relationship between religion and the state.172 The heterogeneous stance of different 
European states on religion makes the Strasbourg Court unwilling to take the lead, which 
it has explicitly stated in its case law.173 
This might explain the general non-interference policy of the ECtHR in Article 9 case 
law, referred to above, but also the fact that the Court has generally given the Contracting 
States much discretion on how to determine the limits of religious manifestation. 
According to Tonolo, this applies especially to the visibility of Islamic symbols.174 
Indeed, case law seems to give back up to the argument: In Dahlab, a school teacher was 
dismissed from a state-owned primary school in Switzerland due to wearing an Islamic 
headscarf. The Strasbourg Court ruled that the measure was “not unreasonable” taking 
into account that the pupils she had been teaching were aged between four and eight and 
thus extremely susceptible to external influences.175 In Sahin, a Turkish university student 
was prohibited from attending her classes because she wore a headscarf.176 ECtHR has 
confirmed several times since Sahin that schools are allowed to determine the dress code 
of their students, with the aim of safeguarding the rights and freedoms of others as well 
as public order.177 As regards the use of religious headscarves in public, the Strasbourg 
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Court has also adopted a rather clear-cut view: a state is allowed to ban religious veils 
that cover the face, based on respect for the conditions of “living together”.178 
In Eweida and Chaplin, the two applicants – a British Airways employee (Ms Eweida) 
and a nurse (Ms Chaplin) – complained of their respective employers for prohibiting the 
wearing of Christian crosses at work. As regards the first applicant, Ms Eweida, the Court 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 9. The Court argued that the 
employer’s wish to present a certain corporate image was not as important as Ms Eweida’s 
desire to manifest her belief. The Court added, however, that the fact that the cross worn 
by Ms Eweida was small and discreet, affected the Court decision. As far as the second 
applicant (Ms Chaplin) was concerned, the Court ruled that clinical safety weighed more 
in the balance than Ms Chaplin’s wish to wear a religious cross. Accordingly, the hospital 
managers were allowed to restrict the wearing of crosses.179 
In all of these cases, ECtHR has been outspoken on the Contracting states’ margin of 
appreciation in determining the limits of freedom of religion in each case and in each 
national context. The Court has justified its stance by referring to different cultural and 
legal traditions of each state. In general, it has accepted the argument that limiting 
religious manifestation may be necessary in a democratic society. In fact, the threshold 
for imposing those limitations seems to be rather low. Only in Eweida, the Strasbourg 
Court prioritized the applicant’s freedom to manifest her religion over the British 
Airways’ wish to project a neutral image of itself, but based on the brief case law review 
above, the decision seems rather an exception than the rule. 
3.3 Comparison of the two non-discrimination frameworks 
3.3.1 Institutional background, personal and material scope, procedural aspects 
As explained above, the institutional role of the right not to be discriminated against is 
very different in the two European legal regimes. In EU law, non-discrimination was 
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originally merely a tool to promote European integration, more specifically the 
functioning of the single market. It is also one of the areas where the ECJ has been accused 
of ‘activism’ i.e. expansive reading of EU law. The Strasbourg Court, however, starts its 
analysis from one of the substantive articles, in a case of religious non-discrimination 
from Article 9 (freedom of religion and belief). For ECtHR, non-discrimination is not a 
right per se but a principle that applies within the ambit of other rights of the Convention 
(“accessory character”). Its violation will not be examined by the Court when other rights 
in the Convention are regarded as being violated (“subsidiarity”). 
 
The personal scope of a right refers to its beneficiaries, whereas its material scope relates 
to its domains of application.180 Article 14 ECHR is binding only on public authorities, 
but protects all physical and legal persons, as individuals or groups of individuals under 
the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party.181 In contrast with the ECHR, EU non-
discrimination law is binding even in horizontal relationships (between private actors), as 
confirmed by the EU Court in cases Mangold and Kücükdeveci.182 The material scope of 
Article 14 ECHR is limited, encompassing all areas of national law – but only if one of 
the Convention rights applies.183 The material scope of EU non-discrimination law was 
originally limited but has subsequently been widened. 
 
For both regimes, comparison is the method to define whether discrimination has taken 
place. If situations are not comparable, the difference of treatment does not need to be 
justified and cannot be discriminatory. It should be also pointed out that choosing the 
right comparator, i.e. the situation to compare to, might sound straightforward, but legal 
practice reveals that it is not. In fact, cases Achita and Bougnaoui conveniently illustrate 
this: In Achbita, the EU Court and AG Kokott chose to compare Ms Achbita with any 
other worker who wanted to manifest his religion of belief at work, whereas AG 
Sharpston compared Ms Bougnaoui with employees who did not manifest any belief.184 
                                                          
180 Besson, S. (2012), p. 160. 
181 Ibid, p. 161. 
182 See chapter 3.1.2. 
183 Besson, S. (2012), p. 162. 
184 Case Achbita, para 31; Opinion of AG Kokott, paras 51-53; Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 88. 
40 
 
It goes without saying that the comparator chosen has direct repercussions on the result 
of the comparison test. 
 
Even though both courts nowadays emphasize substantive equality over formal equality 
(by acknowledging that sometimes rules that appear equal might have unequal 
consequences), they still have differing views on the grounds on which direct 
discrimination can be justified. The wording of Article 14 EHCR as to the potential 
grounds for discrimination is open-ended. The Court has further underlined the open-
endedness by stating that the list written into the Article 14 is “illustrative and non-
exhaustive”.185 EU law takes a different stance on the matter. Its list of possible grounds 
is rather a closed one (i.e. pre-determined).186 Furthermore, the ECtHR recognizes some 
grounds as ’suspect’, which makes its scrutiny more intense in those cases. This is 
something that EU law is not familiar with (even though some researchers argue that also 
the ECJ makes de facto distinctions).187 
 
Interestingly, where the two courts also diverge is the respect they give to national 
constitutional requirements. Whereas the ECtHR has been inclined to grant a broad 
margin of appreciation to the Contracting States in Article 14 cases188, the ECJ has been 
accused of excessive activism. This is noted for example by Speekenbrink who points out 
that the ECJ does not usually let the discretion left to the Member States disturb its 
rulings.189 In general, to Speekenbrink, the tension between diversity and uniformity 
seems less pertinent in the Strasbourg system.190 This is because, as also Brems notes, the 
Strasbourg system is not such a “superstructure” as EU law, but rather builds on 
commonly shared European values.191 On the other hand, for the EU Court the consensus 
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among the Member States is not a similar requirement. Its case law suggests that it has 
not been a determining factor for the rulings taken by the EU Court.192 
From an institutional point of view, thus, non-discrimination as a legal issue seems to be 
more fundamental to the functioning and objectives of the European Union. 
3.3.2 Freedom of religion v. non-discrimination on religious grounds 
Ultimately, the biggest difference between EU law and the ECHR is that they approach 
the issue of religious discrimination from diverging angles. The approach of EU law is 
collective (non-discrimination), whereas the ECHR is more focused on the freedom of 
religion as a civil right, which a state needs to respect by non-interference. In general, EU 
law sees the principle of non-discrimination contributing to economic and social progress. 
Therefore, apart from being an individual human right, non-discrimination is also an issue 
of collective interest. And because of the collective significance attached to it, EU law 
has adopted a strict stance on non-discrimination. On the contrary, the ECtHR position 
(on freedom of religion) has traditionally been more lenient. 
This difference brings the cases of Achibita and Bougnaoui into an interesting light. 
Despite this underlying divergence, in the two cases, the EU Court accepted the position 
taken by the Strasbourg Court without criticism. Only AG Sharpston recognized the 
difference in EU law and the ECHR perspectives.193 Consequently, she was the only one 
to adopt a strict stand on the issue. 
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4 Cases Achbita and Bougnaoui from an institutional perspective 
 
This chapter discusses cases Achbita and Bougnaoui from both legal and institutional 
perspectives, which of course also intertwine. The text begins with presenting the facts of 
the cases as well as the ECJ decisions and the two AG opinions preceding those decisions. 
The most important observation of the chapter is that the decisions and the preceding 
opinions of the two Advocates General are internally incoherent and unanimous on 
several core issues. The EU Court struggles to define whether cases constitute direct or 
indirect discrimination (or neither), and also fails also build on existing ECJ non-
discrimination case law. Instead, in Achbita and Bougnaoui the EU Court chooses to 
follow the more restrictive ECtHR example. This is somewhat surprising, taking into 
account the elementary importance of equal treatment in employment for the objectives 
of the European Union as a whole, as well as the Court’s traditional activism in that area. 
The chapter argues that the two decisions reveal the multitude of political, legal and 
institutional objectives of the European Union, intertwined in ECJ adjudication, in line 
with the institutional account of the EU Court as presented by Moorhead. In Achbita and 
Bougnaoui, the EU Court deems necessary to prioritize sensitive national interests (the 
constitutional principle of secularism in France and Belgium) over supremacy 
requirement and legal coherence. The chapter ends by arguing that the ECJ ruled as it did 
in order to safeguard the stability of the European project in the longer term. In a 
politically contested area, it would explain the rupture to the Court’s previous case law. 
4.1 Facts of the cases 
 
Ms Samira Achbita joined G4S Secure Solutions NV (hereinafter referred to as ‘G4S’), 
based in Belgium, as a receptionist under an employment contract of indefinite duration 
on 12 February 2003. Already in 2003, there was an unwritten company rule that G4S 
employees were not to wear any religious, political or philosophical symbols while at 
work. The rule was included into the G4S employee code of conduct at the end of May 
2006, with effect from 13 June 2006. At first Ms Achbita, who was already a practicing 
Muslim at the time when she joined the company, wore headscarf (a hijab) solely outside 
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working hours. In April 2006, she however announced that in future she would wear a 
headscarf during working hours as well, for religious reasons. The company management 
objected to this decision as it considered it to be against the neutrality policy of the G4S. 
On 12 May 2006, following a period of sickness, Ms Achbita informed the company 
management that she would be returning to work, wearing a headscarf. On 12 June 2006, 
Ms Achbita was dismissed, due to her insistence on wearing the Islamic headscarf at 
work.194 
On 26 April 2007, Ms Achbita brought before the Labour Court of Antwerp an action for 
damages for wrongful dismissal against G4S, seeking, in the alternative, damages for 
infringement of the Law to combat discrimination. In 2009, the Belgian Centre for Equal 
Opportunities and Combating Racism (Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor 
racismebestridjning, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Centrum’) joined the proceedings as 
an intervener supporting the arguments of Ms Achbita. By judgment of 27 April 2010, 
the Labour Court dismissed the action brought by Ms Achbita and stated that no direct or 
indirect discrimination had taken place. Subsequently also the Antwerp Higher Labour 
Court took the same position, clarifying that in the light of the lack of consensus in case 
law and legal literature, the internal policy of G4S could not be judged illegal: Ms 
Achbita’s dismissal could neither be regarded as manifestly unreasonable nor 
discriminatory.195 Ms Achbita and the Centrum lodged an appeal in cassation of the 
judgment. Thereafter the case reached the Belgian Court of Cassation, which decided to 
refer the following question to the EU Court for a preliminary ruling: 
“Should article 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 [establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation] be interpreted as meaning 
that the prohibition on wearing, as a female Muslim, a headscarf at the workplace does not 
constitute direct discrimination where the employer’s rule prohibits all employees from wearing 
outward signs of political, philosophical and religious beliefs at the workplace?”196 
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Ms Asma Bougnaoui was employed as a design engineer by Micropole SA, a private 
sector enterprise operating in France. Her contract of employment with Micropole started 
on 15 July 2008. In mid-June 2009, she was called to a discussion revealing that her 
employer was considering dismissing her unless she agreed not to wear her religious veil 
(a hijab) at work anymore. Ms Bougnaoui refused and was subsequently dismissed by 
letter of 22 June 2009. According to the letter, the subject of wearing a veil had been 
addressed with Ms Bougnaoui several times, starting from the job interview. Ms 
Bougnaoui had been explained “very clearly” that Micropole expected discretion of its 
employees as regards the expression of their personal beliefs and preferences when 
interacting with the company’s clients (“principle of necessary neutrality”).197 However, 
the decisive factor seems to have been the negative customer feedback Micropole had 
received in May 2009. The dismissal letter explains the situation by stating: 
“We asked you to work for the client --- on 15 May, at their site in Toulouse. Following that 
work, the client told us that the wearing of a veil, which you in fact wore every day, had 
embarrassed a number of its employees. It also requested that there should be ‘no veil next 
time’.”198 
Based on these facts, the employer had concluded that continuing the contract of 
employment was impossible, taking into account that much of Ms Bougnaoui’s work was 
supposed to take place at clients’ premises. Since Ms Bougnaoui was not considered fit 
to continue at her position until the end of her notice period – which at the time was still 
ongoing – the remuneration for that period was withheld by the employer. The letter 
concludes: 
“We regret this situation as your professional competence and your potential had led us to hope 
for a long-term collaboration”.199 
In November 2009, Ms Bougnaoui challenged the dismissal before the Paris Labour 
Tribunal, claiming that it was a discriminatory act based on her religious beliefs. The 
Association de défense des droits de l’homme, ADDH, intervened voluntarily. By 
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judgment of 4 May 2001, the tribunal held the dismissal to be well founded. On appeal 
by Ms Bougnaoui and cross-appeal by Micropole, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the 
judgment of the Labour Tribunal by judgment of 18 April 2013.200 Finally, the case 
reached the Paris Court of Cassation. Since that court felt uncertain of the correct 
interpretation of EU law in the circumstances of the case, it decided to refer the following 
question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: 
“Must article 4 (1) [of Directive 2000/78] be interpreted as meaning that the wish of a customer 
of an information technology consultation company no longer to have the information 
technology services of that company provided by an employee, a design engineer, wearing an 
Islamic headscarf, is a genuine and determining occupational requirement, by reason of the 
nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are 
carried out?”201 
 
4.2 Legal analysis 
 
4.2.1 ECJ decisions in Achbita and Bougnaoui 
 
Due to similarities of the facts, the EU Court decided to give its decisions in both cases 
on the same day, the 14th of March 2017. Both cases were decided in the Grand Chamber 
format, which is to suggest that the decisions are to be read in parallel. In both cases, a 
Muslim woman had been dismissed due to wearing an Islamic hijab scarf at work. In 
Achbita, the dismissal was based on existing (recently drafted) company policy 
prohibiting all visible political, philosophical and religious symbols, whereas in 
Bougnaoui no such written policy existed. This was the first time the EU Court reflected 
discrimination based on religion or belief in the context of the Council Directive 
2000/78/EC, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Framework Directive’). 
It is good to note, however, that despite the similar contexts the questions referred to the 
EU Court for preliminary ruling were different. In Achbita, the Belgian Court of Cassation 
was interested in hearing whether the company policy of G4S prohibiting the wearing of 
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religious scarves was directly discriminatory in a situation where that policy prohibited 
the wearing of all religious, political and philosophical symbols. On the other hand, in 
Bougnaoui, the French Court of Cassation asked if the wish of a customer was a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement in the meaning of Art. 4 (1) of the Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC – and therefore could serve as a legitimate justification for direct 
discrimination. 
In Achbita, the EU Court was rather quick to conclude that the internal rule of G4S treated 
all employees in the same way, by requiring them to dress neutrally. It banned any 
manifestation of a personal belief, whether based on political, religious or philosophical 
thinking. Therefore the Court concluded that the prohibition to wear an Islamic headscarf 
at work, which arises from an internal rule of a private company prohibiting the visible 
wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign in the workplace, does not 
constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief for the purposes of Art. 2 (2) 
(a) of the Directive.202 
In principle, the EU Court acknowledged that the referring court could still ultimately 
conclude that the apparently neutral policy of G4S actually results in putting persons 
adhering to a particular religion or belief at a particular disadvantage. In this case, the 
policy would amount to difference of treatment indirectly based on religion or belief, 
which, as explained above, is also prohibited under EU law.203 
That said, the Court uses several paragraphs to “provide guidance” for the national court 
in the matter.204 In fact, ultimately the ECJ leaves very little leeway for the national court 
by being perfectly clear on several issues: Firstly, according to the EU Court, a company’s 
desire to display, in relation with its customers, a policy of political, philosophical or 
religious neutrality “must” be regarded as legitimate.205 It also considers a company 
policy prohibiting all political, philosophical and religious attire an appropriate way to 
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safeguard a neutral image, if that policy is applied in a consistent manner.206 As far as the 
last part of the proportionality test is concerned – whether the ban is a necessary means 
to reach the objective i.e. safeguarding a neutral image – the Court decides to set the bar 
high. It expects this type of prohibition to be limited to what is “strictly necessary”.207 
According to the Court, in this case only a measure limiting the ban to those employees 
that interact with customers would be strictly necessary. Consequently, the ECJ advises 
the national court to assess whether it would have been possible for G4S to offer Ms 
Achbita a post not involving any visual contact with customers, instead of simply 
dismissing her.208 
As mentioned above, in Bougnaoui the starting point is different. The company in which 
Ms Bougnaoui was working, Micropole SA, did not have a written policy prohibiting the 
wearing of political, philosophical and religious symbols. The positions of both women 
involved direct customer contact, albeit in a different context (Ms Achbita worked as a 
receptionist whereas Ms Bougnaoui was a design engineer, working in close contact with 
the company’s customers including in their own facilities). It is also to be recalled that in 
Bougnaoui the question referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling differed from that of 
Achbita. In Bougnaoui, the French Court of Cassation wanted to know whether the wish 
of Micropole SA’s customer to no longer work with Ms Achbita, wearing an Islamic 
headscarf, constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement in the 
meaning of Art. 4 (1) of the Council Directive 2000/78. 
In Bougnaoui, the Court elaborates on the concept of genuine and determining 
occupational requirement. It explains that according to Art. 4 (1) of the Directive, it is not 
the ground on which the difference of treatment is based but a characteristic related to 
that ground that must constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement. The 
Court also points out that in accordance with Recital 23 of the Directive, it is only in very 
limited circumstances that a characteristic related, in particular, to religion may constitute 
a genuine and determining occupational requirement.209 The final answer of the Court to 
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the question posed is thus concise and clear: it states that the concept of genuine and 
determining occupational requirement does not cover subjective considerations, such as 
in this case the customer opinion.210 
4.2.2 Direct v. indirect discrimination 
The first important observation in the decisions and the preceding opinions of the two 
Advocates General is that they are internally incoherent as to whether cases constitute 
direct or indirect discrimination – or neither. AG Kokott acknowledges that strictly 
speaking, a ban such as that imposed by G4S could be regarded as constituting direct 
discrimination within the meaning of Art. 2 (2) (a) of the Directive as it prohibits the 
company employees from wearing visible signs of their religious beliefs in the workplace 
– a wording directly linked to religion. As AG Kokott explains, in its previous case law 
the ECJ has usually adopted a broad understanding of the concept of direct discrimination, 
and assumed such discrimination to be present where a measure has been linked to the 
reason for the difference of treatment.211 
What makes case Achbita different to AG Kokott is that religion is not such an objective 
fact like race or gender. To her, wearing a religious scarf is based on “a subjective decision 
or conviction”, i.e. the person can choose whether to wear it or not.212 This is a 
contradictory view, as argued for example by Vickers. Some people claim that a person 
can choose his religion and change the ways in which he practices his religion, to avoid 
the resulting disadvantage. On the other hand, some think that most believers tend to 
understand themselves as chosen rather than choosing their faith. Also, there is little 
mobility between religious groups in practice, which might suggest that the existence of 
free choice is limited.213 Interestingly the opinion of AG Sharpston in Bougnaoui seems 
to align with this view, in opposition to AG Kokott. To AG Sharpston, religion is not 
necessarily a chosen characteristic and even when it is, the choice is closely related to an 
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individual’s identity: “Just like skin color or sex, a person’s religious identity follows him 
everywhere”.214 
This difference between the two Advocates General has drastic consequences for their 
respective conclusions. The fact that AG Kokott regards religion as something one can 
leave by the door when entering the workplace, leads her to conclude that the measures 
taken by the employer (G4S) do not constitute unlawful direct discrimination based on 
religion within the meaning of Art. 2 (2) (a) of the Directive.215 In its decision, the Court 
aligns itself to this view.216 In contrast, in Bougnaoui AG Sharpston concludes that a 
company policy requiring an employee to remove her Islamic headscarf when in contact 
with clients constitutes unlawful direct discrimination.217 
4.2.3 Justifications 
As explained in chapter 3.1.1, EU law separates between (prohibited) discrimination and 
(permissible) differential treatment. Differential treatment is accepted in contexts where 
it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and if the means of achieving 
that aim are appropriate and necessary (i.e. the proportionality of the measure). Against 
this background, it is obvious that the way ‘legitimate aims’ and ‘proportionality’ are 
defined in each case has direct consequences for their conclusions. 
In Achbita and Bougnaoui, the Court seems to be uncertain how to define these two 
concepts. In Achbita, it states that a policy of religious neutrality “must be considered 
legitimate” taking into account the heavy emphasis EU law puts on the freedom to 
conduct a business.218 This approach is cross-referenced by the Court also in 
Bougnaoui.219 In other words, the ECJ takes for granted that the policy of neutrality is a 
legitimate aim and therefore justifies differential treatment in a private company. 
However, simultaneously in Bougnaoui the Court also insists that a desire to respect a 
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customer wish cannot be a legitimate excuse for restricting religious outfit. Instead, any 
such requirement should be objectively justified, relying on the nature of the occupational 
activities concerned.220 
As Collins and Howard rightly point out, EU law does not mention neutrality as one of 
the legitimate aims for differential treatment.221 The decision in Achbita is thus based on 
the ECJ’s interpretation of EU law, not an explicit wording of it. The ECJ stance might 
have its roots in the changing political landscape in Europe, with the rise of populist 
movements and the growing influx of immigrants from third countries. Questions of 
assimilation and toleration are intensely debated across the EU. In her opinion, AG Kokott 
is outspoken of this reality.222 
On the other hand, in its Article 9 case law, elaborated in chapter 3.2.3, the Strasbourg 
Court has used the concept of neutrality. For instance in Kurtulmus, it held that a civil 
servant may be required to dress “neutrally” (by not wearing an Islamic headscarf).223 In 
Dahlab, the ECtHR required a public school teacher to respect the “neutrality of the State 
primary-education system”, by not wearing a religious headscarf.224 In Sahin, the Court 
ruled that the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public 
order justifies the restriction of religious outfit in a public university, especially in a state 
that constitutionally adheres to the principle of secularism.225 
In all of the aforementioned cases, however, religious neutrality is discussed as a means 
to uphold state secularism as opposed to a business interest of a private company (as in 
Achbita and Bougnaoui). For this reason, case Eweida becomes an important point for 
reference. In Eweida, the Strasbourg Court was required to assess whether the British 
Airways (BA) company dress code was a strong enough excuse to prohibit the wearing 
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of a religious cross from Ms Eweida, a BA employee. When considering the aim of the 
dress code i.e. communicating “a certain image of the company”, the Court found that it 
was legitimate.226 It did not use the term neutrality as such but substantively, the idea 
seems to be similar. In Achbita, also the ECJ seems to interpret Eweida in this way.227 
It is also to be recalled that under EU law, justifying differential treatment directly based 
on prohibited grounds is more difficult than justifying indirect discrimination. Direct 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is only possible if the nature of the 
particular occupational activities so insist (“a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement”), or if it is necessary for the maintenance of public order and security, or for 
the protection of the health, rights and freedoms of others.228 
Here again, the ECJ decisions and the preceding opinions of the two Advocates General 
differ. AG Kokott emphasizes the role of the employer who should have the power to 
define whether specific occupational requirements are ‘genuine and determining’. To AG 
Kokott, the employer must be allowed “a certain degree of discretion in the pursuit of its 
business, the basis of which lies ultimately in the fundamental right of freedom to conduct 
a business”.229 It is also perfectly legitimate for the employer to require a religiously 
neutral dress code of his employees, if that is what his customers wish for.230 AG Kokott 
therefore concludes that a ban as such laid down by G4S may be regarded as a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the Directive.231 She 
also argues that the wearing of visible signs of religious beliefs may be prejudicial to the 
rights of freedoms of other employees and customers as well as to the employers’ freedom 
to conduct a business.232 
On the contrary, AG Sharpston refuses to accept that Ms Bougnaoui would have been 
unable to perform her tasks as a design engineer just because she wore an Islamic 
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headscarf. Consequently, to her, the requirement of not to wear a religious headscarf while 
in contact with customers cannot be considered a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement in the meaning of Article 4 (1) of Council Directive 2000/78.233 AG 
Sharpston further adds that direct discrimination can neither be justified on the ground of 
potential financial loss that might be caused to the employer.234 She also rejects the idea 
that a prohibition of wearing religious symbols would be necessary for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.235 According to existing ECJ case law, both Article 4 
(1) i.e. the occupational requirements and Article 2 (5) must be interpreted strictly.236 
Besides the legitimate aim requirement, also the proportionality aspect requires further 
attention. In Achbita, the Court suggests that the requirement of religious neutrality only 
applies to employees with customer contact, and even on those occasions, the measures 
taken must be “strictly necessary”.237 At first sight, the Court thus seems to impose a strict 
justification test – as it has usually done in non-discrimination cases.238 That said the 
ruling leaves questions as to actual implementation of that test. Is it really the intention of 
EU legislator to promote non-discrimination in employment by hiding certain employees 
out of sight, as the EU Court suggests? That would seem to run counter even the EU 
Court’s own approach to promoting “pluralism and broadmindedness as hallmarks of a 
democratic society”.239 The interpretation is controversial also taking into account the 
Court’s earlier decision in CGKR / Firma Freyn, where it explicitly stated that a situation 
where an employer declares publicly that it will not recruit employees of a certain ethnic 
or racial origin, based on its clients’ wishes, constitutes direct discrimination.240 Why 
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would it then be acceptable for an employer to hide these employees out of sight due to 
its clients’ wishes? 
4.3 Institutional analysis 
4.3.1 Integration 
As it has become clear, non-discrimination in employment is an area where the EU Court 
has been very active. There are several landmark cases in that area, which have underlined 
the supremacy of EU law and promoted legal integration within the Union.241 During the 
past decades, the scope of EU non-discrimination law has been expanded with active 
support of the ECJ: whereas before only the grounds of sex and nationality could be 
invoked in private disputes, now the horizontal direct effect of EU non-discrimination 
law takes place in various settings and on various grounds.242 Cases such as Mangold and 
Kücükdeveci have also clarified that for the ECJ, the principle of equal treatment is one 
of the general principles of EU law (only given expression in Directive 2000/78), 
originating from various international instruments and constitutional traditions common 
to the EU Member States.243 It has thus become one of the fundamental building blocks 
of EU law. 
Therefore, the most glaring finding in the analysis above is that in Achbita and Bougnaoui, 
the EU Court left unutilized the possibility to build on its previous case law in non-
discrimination and chose instead to follow the ECtHR. In other words, it chose restraint 
over activism. This is also noted by Howard who points out that in Achbita and 
Bougnaoui, the EU Court treated the grounds of religion differently from other grounds 
of discrimination covered by EU non-discrimination law. To Howard, especially the 
justification test that the Court used was more lenient than normally.244 Also Vickers 
criticizes that in Achbita and Bougnaoui the EU Court left unutilized the opportunity to 
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establish strong standards on how to protect religious equality at work, as it has done with 
other discrimination grounds.245 
As in all other cases, also in Achbita and Bougnaoui the EU Court had in its disposal the 
general principles doctrine. In theory, it could have used it to push for a uniform stance 
at EU level on equal treatment in employment. However, it decided not to use it. In 
Bougnaoui, the EU Court briefly mentions that among the constitutional traditions shared 
by the Member States (i.e. the general principles of EU law) is the right to freedom of 
conscience and religion, but leaves the issue unelaborated.246 In Achbita, AG Kokott 
mentions the general principles doctrine once, but in the context of freedom to conduct a 
business.247 To her, the freedom to conduct a business weighs more in the scale than the 
freedom of religion. Interestingly, AG Sharpston ends up with an exact opposite 
conclusion by arguing that if the business interest of an employer cannot be reconciled 
with the right of an individual employee to manifest his religious convictions, it is the 
latter (and not the former) that should prevail.248 In her opinion, AG Sharpston recognizes 
the general principles doctrine, which she argues “must apply also to religious 
discrimination”.249 The emphasis she puts on religious non-discrimination as a principle 
and objective of EU law is apparent, in contrast to the opinion of AG Kokott. 
Another key tool of the ECJ to promote legal integration is the doctrine of supremacy. 
Here again, the EU Court struggles to decide whether to prioritize Member State 
discretion over supremacy of EU law, or the other way around. In short, AG Kokott seems 
to give more emphasis to the former and AG Sharpston to the latter. 
In her opinion, AG Kokott acknowledges both the potential of the case to influence the 
labor market across the EU as well as the capacity of the ECJ – in principle – to make 
such a ruling.250 However, her objective is clearly not to push the ECJ to take such a role. 
First, she recognizes both the division of competences between the Union and its Member 
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States as well as the obligation of the EU under Article 4 (2) TEU to respect the national 
identities of the Member States, including in the context of equal treatment.251 More 
specifically, AG Kokott emphasizes the importance of recognizing the constitutional 
principle of secularism in France as well as its capacity to affect the way people dress 
themselves: 
“[I]t is important, when interpreting and applying the principle of equal treatment, to have regard 
also to the national identities of Member States inherent in their fundamental structures, both 
political and constitutional… this may mean that, in Member States such as France, where 
secularism has constitutional status and therefore plays an instrumental role in social cohesion, 
too, the wearing of visible religious symbols may legitimately be subject to stricter restrictions 
(even in the private sector and generally in public spaces) than in other Member States, the 
constitutional provisions of which have a different or a less distinct emphasis in this regard.” 
(italics added)252 
Moreover, she underlines the fact that policies and legislation in different EU Member 
States vary in this matter.253 Consequently, she is ready to recommend the ECJ to follow 
the example of the Strasbourg Court in recognizing the margin of appreciation of the 
Member States in this area: 
 “In a case like this, the proportionality test is a delicate matter in the context of which the ECJ, 
following the practice of the ECtHR in relation to Article 9 and 14 case law, should grant the 
national authorities a measure of discretion… In this regard, the Luxembourg court does not 
necessarily have to prescribe a solution that is uniform throughout the European Union.”254 
Also AG Sharpston acknowledges that this is an area of law where views and practices 
differ within the Union. There is no uniform understanding of the role of religion in 
society, and the practices regarding the wearing of religious outfit in employment vary.255 
Despite that, she requires that the same standards are consistently applied to all grounds 
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for discrimination.256 AG Sharpston recognizes the principle of secularism in the French 
and Belgian constitutions257, but as opposed to AG Kokott, highlights the important task 
of adjudicators to ensure that EU non-discrimination law is consistently applied also in 
those contexts. AG Sharpston also acknowledges the wider protection provided by EU 
law in non-discrimination cases, and sees no need to align the view of the EU Court with 
the views of the ECtHR (which from Art. 9 perspective has taken a more restrictive stance 
on the issue).258 
Finally, to AG Sharpston, allowing discriminative treatment for a private sector employer 
due to customer feedback is a particularly dangerous idea, as it legitimates unequal 
treatment of the most vulnerable groups in the labor market, only because some 
prejudiced people require so. This hampers the effectiveness of EU non-discrimination 
law, in fact running counter to its whole raison d’être.259 
4.3.2 Stability 
From the point of view of stability, as understood by the institutional theory, the legal 
analyses taken by the two Advocates General and the EU Court in cases Achbita and 
Bougnaoui reveal interesting divergences. First, there seems to be agreement on specific 
national constitutional requirements being involved, but views on their repercussions 
vary. Second, both AG Kokott and AG Sharpston agree that the cases have the capacity 
to promote legal coherence within the Union, but disagree on whether it is the desired 
direction. Finally, they both recognize the EU Court’s two options of either imposing a 
ruling from above or delegating the decision-making power to domestic level. 
Unsurprisingly, the two Advocates General have differing opinions on which option to 
choose. 
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It is notable that in all of these aspects, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ finally aligns itself 
with the opinion of AG Kokott: by prioritizing the sensitive national interests of the 
Member States involved in the cases, by giving space to legal incoherence instead of 
integration, and by choosing the margin of appreciation over supremacy of EU law. In 
this way, it perhaps hopes to keep the scales in balance, to be able serve the purposes of 
integration in the longer run. This hypothesis seems to get support at least from Vickers: 
“National approaches to religion or belief have long caused tension at the constitutional level of 
the EU, as seen in the difficult debates in the drafting of the EU treaties and the development of 
the EU constitution. [---] It may be that as far as EU integration is concerned, losing sovereignty 
on matters of religion would be a step too far. Given the poor level of political capital enjoyed 
by the EU currently, it is unsurprising that the CJEU has taken an approach that is deferential to 
national context. To do otherwise could have pushed social integration at European level further 
than most Member States would tolerate.”260 
To conclude, one would perhaps be tempted to jump into the conclusion that the decisions 
the EU Court took in Achbita and Bougnaoui were unfavorable to the objective European 
integration, by not posing the cohesion requirement on the Member States. However, 
taking into account the current political atmosphere in Europe it may rather be that the 
long-term stability of the European project was better preserved with a restrictive stance. 
Perhaps Vickers has a point in arguing that judicial activism in this area, at this political 
juncture, would have been too much for the Member States to handle. 
4.3 Additional observations 
Article 9 ECHR case law mostly concentrates on wearing of Islamic headscarves. Thus, 
even though directly linked to religion, the cases are indirectly linked to also gender. The 
approach of the ECtHR to the issue has changed during the recent decades. In Dahlab 
(2001) the Strasbourg Court still claimed, that the wearing of headscarf seems to be 
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imposed on Muslim women, and therefore the practice is hard to reconcile with the 
principle of gender equality. For this reason, religious headscarves could be banned in a 
school environment.261 By contrast, in its judgment S.A.S. (2014), the ECtHR argued for 
an opposite view, claiming that a State Party cannot invoke gender equality to ban a 
practice that is defended by women themselves.262 As far as the EU Court is concerned, 
in Achbita and Bougnaoui the two Advocates General agreed that the issue of gender was 
not relevant to the cases.263 
It would be tempting, however, to think a bit further. As seen in chapter 3, the EU Court 
has been adamant to support equal access to employment, as an important prerequisite for 
economic and social progress within the Union. Overall, gender is one of the most 
frequently discussed ground for discrimination. Despite this background, the EU Court 
did not give the issue much thought. Was gender related to the dismissals of Ms. Achbita 
and Ms. Bougnaoui? In my view, it was, because despite seemingly neutral formulation 
of a company policy, in practice a ban restricting the wearing of religious outfit at work 
affects mostly Muslim women.  
In this context, it would also be tempting to take a deeper look at whether differences of 
treatment based on some other grounds are present. The grounds of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘colour’ 
immediately come to mind, both covered by Art. 2 (2) (b) Directive 7000/78. In its 
decisions, the EU Court does not pay attention to either of these grounds. Only AG Kokott 
shortly raises this option, but soon concludes that a company rule at issue (in Achbita) 
does not put employees of a particular colour or ethnic background at a particular 
disadvantage.264 Surely, the wording of a company rule prohibiting the visible wearing of 
all religious, political, or other signs is neutral. However, in practice such a rule may put 
people of a specific background in a disadvantaged position. 
Finally, both Achbita and Bougnaoui raise the question whether to prioritize the 
individual’s freedom of religion over the employer’s freedom to conduct a business, or 
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the other way around. To AG Sharpston, the former seems to weigh more265, and to AG 
Kokott, the latter266. This divergence has crucial consequences for their respective 
opinions. Groussot, Pétursson and Pierce have recently investigated the EU Court post-
Lisbon Art. 16 EUCFR adjudication (freedom to conduct a business) and concluded that 
the Court still seems to be strongly economically oriented, especially in horizontal 
situations where social and constitutional economic rights are in conflict.267 Cases 
Achbita and Bougnaoui would therefore constitute an interesting context also for this 
discussion. 
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5 Conclusion 
The role of religion in European societies has been a polemic issue for a long time and 
with all likelihood continues to be so. On the one hand, European cultures, identities and 
societies, including their legal systems, are strongly shaped by one of the great world 
religions, Christianity, and cannot be fully understood but through that lens. On the other 
hand, religion in Europe has always been also a divider. Already in the 11th century, the 
Christendom was split into two i.e. the Eastern (Orthodox) and the Western (Catholic) 
churches. Currently, secularization is spreading in West European countries, whereas in 
Eastern Europe (the former Soviet states) religions are gaining new ground.268 Views are 
polarizing also within state borders, as testified by the rise of conservative and rightwing 
movements across Europe. These movements get their vitality from fear and prejudice, 
which have fertile ground in the increased Islamist terrorism as well as large-scale (and 
sometimes poorly managed) immigration from areas neighboring Europe, often with 
Muslim majorities.  
The European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, has a long experience of 
adjudicating cases related to exposure of religious signs and outfit. Its view has usually 
been in favor of the respondent, in contrast with the individual claiming the breach of his 
right to freedom of religion. National adjudicators in Europe have taken divergent views 
on the issue. On the one hand, there are countries such as France and Belgium – where 
the two cases discussed originate from – which prohibit the wearing of religious outfit in 
public and as well as in public employment. On the other hand, there are countries such 
as the UK, or Finland, which have not deemed necessary to restrict the ways people 
manifest their religion in public (or at work).  
The EU Court was faced with the issue of religious discrimination for the first time in 
cases Achbita and Bougnaoui. Perhaps not that surprisingly, it was as tormented by the 
issue as the continent as a whole. Afterwards the decisions have been heavily criticized 
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for their incoherency and loose argumentation, not to mention the rupture to the Court’s 
previous case law. This thesis agrees with much of the criticism posed. 
However, as explained in the introductory chapter, the main objective of this thesis has 
been neither praising nor criticizing the decisions. The intention has rather been to shed 
some light on the historical, legal and political context the EU Court operates in, which 
the thesis claims to have a substantive impact on the court’s human rights rulings. To be 
more precise, the thesis argues that the EU Court not only assesses each case at hand from 
a point of view of EU law in a strict sense, but also from the viewpoint of its relevance 
for the larger European project. In other words, the ECJ assesses whether and how the 
case contributes to the stability of that project, and conversely whether the case has the 
capacity to undermine the long-term objectives of that project. 
To clarify, this is not to argue that the EU Court could not – or would not – take decisions 
that are unwanted by the EU Member States. On the contrary, it has done that since its 
origin, and continues to do so.269 However, as Moorhead argues, it is one thing to question 
the acceptability of a decision, and another to dispute the viability of the EU Court 
altogether.270 From an institutional point of view, this is an important thing to keep in 
mind. Throughout the decades, the ECJ has been criticized for making hasty conclusions 
and for using its power against the interests of the Member States. Despite all this, it is 
also a court with high prestige, capacitated with a wide mandate by the Member States. It 
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Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires; Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovak Pensions 
XVII. European Constitutional Law Review, 8 (2), pp. 323-337. Another recent example is the decision of 
the Danish Supreme Court to disregard the ECJ preliminary ruling in case C-441/14 Dansk Industri, claiming 
that the ECJ does not have competence to give precedence to an unwritten principle of EU law prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of age in a case where it is contrary to national law. Further analysis see e.g. 
Šadl, U. and Mair, S. (2017). Mutual Disempowerment: Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri, acting on behalf of 
Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen and Case no. 15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) acting for Ajos A/S 
v The estate left by A. European Constitutional Law Review, 2017, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 347-368. 
270 Moorhead, T. (2014), pp. 61-62. 
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is the high court of the Union, and its functioning remains of elementary importance for 
the European project – initiated and maintained by the Member States themselves. 
The thesis starts from the observation that the rulings the EU Court took in cases Achbita 
and Bougnaoui constitute a rupture to its previous non-discrimination case law. Instead 
of acknowledging the importance of religious non-discrimination for the European single 
market in general and inclusive labor market in particular, the decisions seem to downplay 
its significance in relation to other grounds for discrimination. References to the Court’s 
previous non-discrimination case law are practically non-existent in the Court decisions, 
as if it was not a relevant context for the cases. On the other hand, the European 
Convention and the ECtHR case law are constantly referred to in the decisions, even 
though they emphasize freedom of religion as opposed to non-discrimination on religious 
grounds, the latter being a more natural angle to EU law. In the decisions, the margin of 
appreciation of the EU Member States is highlighted, in contrast with the supremacy 
doctrine usually adhered to by the EU Court. 
As regards coherence between the two human rights regimes, which has been an issue for 
a long time, Achbita and Bougnaoui first seem to provide alleviation: the EU Court 
decisions in the two cases are well in line with the Strasbourg Court Art. 9 case law. On 
a closer look, however, problems with the chosen approach become visible, primarily the 
obvious differences between the two human rights regimes, not to mention the fact that 
EU law provides the possibility to grant a higher level of protection for human rights than 
the ECHR (as shortly discussed in chapter 2.3.2). Only AG Sharpston raises this option 
in her opinion. Overall, she is the only one to give recognition to the differences between 
the approaches of the two human rights regimes to non-discrimination. 
The thesis thus reveal some of the problems still attached to the European human rights 
regime: The European Union as a legal system has been constructed upon specific 
interests and objectives, which differ from those of the Council of Europe and the ECHR. 
Both the raison d’être and the modus operandi of the two systems are markedly different. 
From another perspective: in cases where the EU Court heavily leans on the Strasbourg 
court, it may – accidentally or deliberately – disregard some of the parameters of EU law. 
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Based on this it therefore seems that comparison of the EU Court’s human rights case law 
with the Strasbourg Court’s case law continues to be necessary. The Lisbon Treaty has 
not eliminated the barriers between the two regimes, nor does synchronization seem a 
probable future scenario. Non-discrimination is one of the areas where the institutional 
differences between the two regimes need to be taken into account. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the two cases reveal the contextual reality in which the EU 
Court operates. Despite its widened human rights mandate, the ECJ is not a human rights 
court but the high court of the European Union. It is an autonomous, but not a politically 
or legally isolated organization. In Achbita and Bougnaoui the Court was forced to 
balance between its various objectives and decided to prioritize stability over legal 
coherence. Taking into account the current political climate, it may have chosen wisely. 
However, for the purposes of creating a prosperous single market in general and an 
inclusive labor market in particular, the decisions seem inexpedient. As Europe is 
becoming more and more heterogeneous, religious and cultural pluralism are issues that 
also the European Union needs to learn to utilize (instead of trying to curtail them). 
Theoretically, the thesis argues that the institutional theory as presented by Moorhead 
provides a fruitful framework for analyzing the Court’s line of reasoning. According to 
Moorhead, in its adjudication the EU Court aims at sustaining the supremacy of EU law, 
in a manner consistent with the Member States’ constitutional requirements, while also 
advancing the project of European integration. In other words, it aims at reaching 
balanced decisions – not because it is pressured to do that by the Member States, as 
intergovernmentalists would argue, but because it is in the Court’s own interest to do so. 
The theory seems to provide a convincing answer to the question why the EU Court 
sometimes shows restraint, even in situations where it is not expected to do so. It may 
very well be the case, as Moorhead argues, that the institutional positioning of the EU 
Court makes its case law hard to predict. Based on the two cases it seems that the emphasis 
the EU Court gives – in a specific field of law, at a specific juncture – to its various 
objectives, has a direct bearing on its rulings. 
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To conclude, the aim of this thesis is not to argue that the institutional theory would 
provide an all-encompassing or exclusive framework in which to analyze the EU Court’s 
human rights decisions. Rather, the main argument of this thesis is that in constructing 
the picture of the EU Court as a human rights adjudicator – a task that is more pertinent 
than ever before – its institutional positioning needs to be taken into account. It is echoed 
in the ways the ECJ uses the doctrine of supremacy, the ways it draws (or does not draw) 
parallels between EU law and international human rights law, particularly the ECHR, and 
the ways it balances between EU law and national law. If nothing more, cases Achbita 
and Bougnaoui show that these are among the issues the EU Court considers in making 
its rulings. 
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